Courts, Legislation and Delaware Corporate Law

Assaf Hamdani[*] **and Kobi Kastiel**[**]

Working Draft; January 2025

Delaware is widely regarded as the global capital of corporate law and the leader in attracting incorporations. Until recently, the prevailing view has been that while Delaware relies on its specialized courts to establish critical corporate law norms, its legislature plays a relatively passive role in major corporate law issues. In this Article, we challenge this perception by analyzing amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) from 1967 to 2024 and identifying a consistent pattern of legislative responses to judicial decisions. We argue that Delaware's reliance on these legislative responses addresses the inherent limitations of its judge-made law model. Legislative interventions enable courts to set norms without imposing out-of-pocket liability on corporate insiders, balance fiduciary duties with private ordering, and overcome other institutional constraints of courts as lawmakers. The interplay between courts and legislation also allows Delaware to adapt to stakeholder pressures and mitigate the risk of federal intervention. However, too frequent or contentious judicial overrides could create tension between the two branches and be viewed as undermining judicial independence. Uncovering the pattern of legislative responses raises new questions about the forces shaping Delaware's corporate law and the underlying interaction between its judiciary and legislative branches. This Article explores some of these questions and considers implications for future research.

[*] Professor of Law, Tel Aviv University; Research Member, the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI).

[**] Professor of Law, Tel Aviv University; Research Member, the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI).

The authors would like to thank **[to be added]**, as well as participants at the NYU Law & Economics Workshop, University of Michigan Law School Faculty Workshop, Tel Aviv University Faculty Workshop and Corporate Governance Seminar, and the Online Workshop of the Stigler Center's Affiliate Fellows Program at Chicago University for insightful comments and suggestions. We also gratefully acknowledge the excellent research assistance of Tanya Bansal, Celia Garrett, Noam Nagar, Sigal Newmark and Noam Katzenelson. We are especially grateful to Maayan Weisman for her invaluable and critical research assistance throughout our work on this Article.

Table of Contents

Introduction

In March 2024, the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association (the "DSBA" and "Section") proposed amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law (the "DGCL").[1] These amendments responded to three Chancery court opinions. Two amendments addressed M&A-related questions–whether a target can sue on behalf of its shareholders for lost premium damages in a busted deal (*Crispo v. Musk*),[2] and whether a board can approve merger agreements in a "substantially final" form (*Activision Blizzard).*[3] The third amendment responded to the *Moelis* decision, which invalidated several governance provisions in an agreement between a corporation and its founding shareholder.[4]

The 2024 amendments sparked unprecedented public debate.[5] Opponents argued that the anti-*Moelis* amendment was a "major surgery" to Delaware law, providing insiders a *carte blanche* to enter into contracts that change critical corporate governance arrangements without incorporating these changes in the company's charter.[6] Scholars described this amendment as "the most consequential changes to Delaware corporate law of the 21st century."[7] However, less than three months after the proposal was published, and before the Supreme Court of Delaware had the chance to address the matter, Delaware's General Assembly approved the proposed amendments (SB 313).[8]

This Article argues that the 2024 amendments are part of a broader, largely overlooked, story concerning the interplay between legislation and the courts in Delaware. The prevailing view has long been that Delaware's specialized Chancery court, with its expert judges, plays a crucial role in the state's dominance in the market for incorporations.[9] Delaware leaves it to courts to set many corporate law norms through detailed opinions applying fiduciary principles to complex settings.[10] For example, Delaware courts decide whether management can fend off takeover attempts by adopting a poison

---

[1] Proposed Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law, Council of the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association 13 (2024).

[2] *Crispo v. Musk*, 304 A.3d 567 (Del. Ch. 2023).

[3] *Sjunde AP-Fonden v. Activision Blizzard, Inc.*, C.A. No. 2022-1001-KSJM (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2024).

[4] *In West Palm Beach Firefighters' Pension Fund v. Moelis & Co.*, No. 2023-0309-JTL (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2024).

[5] *See infra* Section III.C. For recent articles addressing this debate, *see* Jonathan Macey, *Delaware Law Mid-Century: Far From Perfect but Probably Not Leaving for Las Vegas* (Working Paper, 2024); Joel Friedlander, *Former Chancellor Chandler's Unjust Criticism of Chancellor McCormick and Vice Chancellor Laster: What Does It Signify?* (Working Paper, 2024).

[6] *See infra* note 7; The Long Form - July 18, 2024, CHANCERY DAILY (Senate Debate and Final Vote — Thursday, June 13, 2024). *See also Letter from Jeffrey P. Mahoney, General Counsel, Council of Institutional Investors, to The Honorable John C. Carney, Governor of Delaware*, CII (July 10, 2024), https://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2024/July%2010,%202024%20CII%20letter%20to%20Delaware.pdf.

[7] Sarath Sanga, Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, *Letter in Opposition to the Proposed Amendment to the DGCL*, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jun. 7, 2024), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2024/06/07/letter-in-opposition-to-the-proposed-amendment-to-the-dgcl/; See also Lucian A. Bebchuk, *The Perils of Governance by Stockholder Agreements*, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 21, 2024), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2024/05/21/the-perils-of-governance-by-stockholder-agreements/ (claiming that the amendment would have "detrimental consequences" for investors); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, P*roposed DGCL § 122(18), Long-term Investors, and the Hollowing Out of DGCL § 141(a)*, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 21, 2024) (arguing that it undermines §141(a)'s traditional limits on board delegation).

[8] Some minor changes were made to the original proposal. Delaware General Assembly, Senate Bill 313, 152nd General Assembly (last visited June 20, 2024), https://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail?legislationId=141480. The Governor signed the amendments into law on July 17, 2024. Jennifer Kay, Delaware Corporate Law Amendments Signed into Law by Governor, Bloomberg L. (July 17, 2024), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/bloomberglawnews/business-and-practice/BNA%2000000190-7966-d263-a79e-fbf6271a0001.

[9] *See infra* notes 37-43, and accompanying text.

[10] *See infra* note 20; *Smith v. Van Gorkom* 488 A.2d 858, 866 (Del. 1985).

pill or other defensive measures.[11] In contrast, Delaware's legislature has traditionally been perceived as passive on major corporate law issues,[12] focusing mainly on technical statutory amendments.[13]

We show, however, that this conventional account is incomplete. We examine Delaware's corporate legislation over the past 58 years and identify a *consistent pattern* of legislative responses to judicial decisions.[14] We further claim that legislative responses to court decisions are not only more prevalent than previously thought,[15] but also play an important role in Delaware corporate law. Delaware famously relies on its courts and private litigation to develop corporate law norms, and the courts' reliance on open-ended standards introduces inevitable uncertainty.[16] Scholars have long debated how Delaware maintains its dominance despite its reliance on indeterminate standards to guide corporate conduct. Optimists argue that Delaware courts provide certainty and clarity through a vast set of precedents and informal judicial guidance.[17] Others suggest that Delaware's reliance on vague standards strengthens its competitive advantage by making it difficult for other states to replicate its model.[18]

We do not take a stance on this long-standing debate. Instead, based on our analysis of the interaction between Delaware courts and its legislature over the past 58 years, we argue that Delaware uses legislative amendments to address three challenges.

The *first* challenge is the tension between the reliance on courts to establish corporate law norms and the reluctance to subject officers and directors to out-of-pocket liability for non-conflicted decisions.[19] Delaware relies on its prized judiciary not only to enforce the DGCL, but also to promulgate new norms that guide corporate behavior.[20] These new norms, however, may increase the real or perceived risk of personal liability for corporate officers and directors.[21] To address these concerns, Delaware has used legislation to ensure that court decisions that seem to expand insiders'

---

[11] John Armour & David A. Jr. Skeel, *Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why - The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation*, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727 (2006); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, *Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law*, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1602 (2005) ("The most noteworthy trait of Delaware's corporate law is the extent to which important and controversial legal rules are promulgated by the judiciary, rather than enacted by the legislature.").

[12] Lawrence A. Hamermesh, *The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law*, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749 (2006).

[13] Kahan & Rock, *Symbiotic Federalism, supra* note 11, at 1577 (explaining the legislative changes "address largely technical and noncontroversial matters").

[14] Our study includes only legislative amendments for which there is a *clear indication* of the connection to the judiciary's rulings, either in the amendment documents or in law firms' analysis of these amendments. We discuss our methodology in Part II.A *infra.*

[15] *See* Section I.B. *See also* David A. Skeel, *The Bylaw Puzzle in Delaware Corporate Law*, 72 BUS. LAW. 1, 27 (2017) (noting the dearth of attention to the relationship between the courts and the legislature. According to him, "[e]ven Mark Roe, a particularly acute observer of Delaware institutions, treats Delaware's legislature and courts as more or less interchangeable."). Mark J. Roe, *Delaware's Politics*, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491 (2005) (presenting a few legislative and judicial changes as examples of Delaware's responsiveness to Congress and federal agencies).

[16] *See* Ehud Kamar, *A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law*, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998). This has led some scholars to suggest that Delaware law relies on open-ended standards to a greater extent than is optimal. *Id. See also* Kahan & Rock, *Symbiotic Federalism, supra* note 11; Douglas M. Branson, *Indeterminacy: The Final Ingredient in an Interest Group Analysis of Corporate Law*, 43 VAND. L. REV. 85 (1990). Under this view, firms may incorporate in Delaware due to its other advantages, such as network benefits. Michael Klausner, *Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts*, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995). *See also* the sources in *infra* notes 43-49.

[17] *See infra* note 47.

[18] *See infra* note 68.

[19] For a discussion, *see infra* Subsection II.B.1

[20] *See, e.g.,* Edward B. Rock, *Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?*, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997); Charles M. Elson, *The Duty of Care, Compensation and Stock Ownership,* 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 649 (1995).

[21] *See infra* notes 90–92, and accompanying text. In this Article, we do not take a stand on the appropriate level of out-of-pocket liability that should be imposed and whether the balance chosen by Delaware is socially optimal.

liability do not leave directors and officers exposed to a meaningful risk of out-of-pocket liability. The most famous example is the enactment of Section 102(b)(7) (which exculpates directors from monetary liability for breaches of duty of care) in the aftermath of *Smith v. Van Gorkom*.[22] But there are more recent examples: one 2022 amendment authorized self-insurance (captive insurance) to protect directors against oversight claims following the *Boeing* air crash derivative settlement.[23] Another 2022 amendment allowed companies to extend the 102(b)(7) protection to officers (and not just directors) in response to developments in merger litigation.[24] These legislative amendments did not overturn the courts' decisions concerning the scope of insiders' duties. Rather, they expanded the set of arrangements that companies can deploy to shield insiders from out-of-pocket liability.

The *second* challenge arises from the nature of the doctrinal toolkit that courts use. Whether it is hostile takeovers, responses to shareholder activism, friendly sales, related-party transactions, or even bylaw amendments, courts ultimately rely on directors' fiduciary duties as a basis for promulgating norms.[25] The nearly universal scope of fiduciary duties can make it difficult for courts to interpret them in a manner that is tailored to specific contexts. Consider, for example, the principle that fiduciaries cannot agree to arrangements that limit their discretion.[26] This principle could lead to undesirable outcomes in specific cases. For example, it led Delaware's Supreme Court to limit *shareholders'* ability to adopt certain bylaw amendments.[27] Recognizing the advantages of limiting directors' discretion in this setting, Delaware amended the DCGL and essentially carved out an exception to directors' fiduciary duties.

Moreover, one of the core features of Delaware's corporate law is its reliance on private ordering. An issue that becomes the subject of private ordering is no longer governed by directors' fiduciary duties. Only legislation, however, can move an issue from the realm of fiduciary duties to that of private ordering.[28] Consider the renunciation of the prohibition on appropriating corporate opportunities by corporate fiduciaries. The court expressed doubt about the permissibility of including such a provision in the corporate charter.[29] A legislative amendment expressly provided that private ordering governed this area.[30]

The *third* challenge is not unique to corporate law and arises from courts' institutional limitations as lawmakers. Some issues require balancing the interests of stakeholders across different legal questions—an approach that courts, constrained by statutory provisions and required to adjudicate specific disputes, are ill-equipped to handle. Additionally, judicial opinions can raise questions or otherwise create uncertainty within the corporate community, which relies on judicial decisions for guidance.[31] While courts can restore certainty by clarifying their position in a future ruling, they must wait for the right case to arrive.[32] At the same time, companies might be hesitant to

---

[22] *See infra* Subsection II.B.2

[23] *Id.*

[24] *See infra* Subsections II.B.2-3

[25] *See infra* Subsection II.C.2.

[26] *See* most recently, the *Moelis* decision, *supra* note 4.

[27] *See* Skeel, *supra* note 15, at 12; *CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan*, 953 A.2d 227, 239 (Del. 2018) (holding that shareholders cannot adopt bylaws that require directors to reimburse proxy expenses in a manner that essentially prevents directors from discharging their fiduciary duties).

[28] *See New Enterprise Associates 14, L.P. v. Rich*, 2023 WL 1857123 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2023).

[29] *See Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc.,* 1989 WL 48746, at *8 (Del. Ch. May 5, 1989).

[30] The statute does not require that these advanced renouncements be incorporated into the companies' charter.

[31] *See* Rock, *Saints and Sinners*, *supra* note 20.

[32] Kahan & Rock, *Symbiotic Federalism, supra* note 11, at 1603–1604 (Delaware judges promote their judicial philosophy outside the courtroom by writing articles, speaking at conferences, and lecturing to corporate directors).

adopt strategies that could be challenged in court. This can lead to *sticky norms*. Legislation, in contrast, can restore certainty and eliminate the sticky norms problem.

Our analysis sheds a new light on Delaware's competitive strategy. Delaware relies on its pattern of legislative responses to address the inevitable shortcomings of its judge-made law model. Legislative amendments often supplement judicial rulings, clarify ambiguities, and judges themselves invite legislative interventions. Legislative interventions also allow Delaware to respond to various stakeholder pressures and address the threat of federal intervention. Finally, Delaware's interplay between its judiciary and legislative branches is hard to mimic by competitors that wish to challenge Delaware's dominance, such as Nevada, Texas, or foreign jurisdictions.

Uncovering the pattern of legislative responses raises new questions about the forces that shape Delaware's corporate law. One question is whether different objectives guide Delaware's legislature and its courts. While our study is subject to limitations that prevent us from providing a definite answer, we offer tentative observations. We first focus on the substance of the legislative amendments in our sample. About half of these responses do not seem to address issues that involve conflicts between managers and shareholders. Second, while we identify a consistent pattern of providing companies with more ways to insulate insiders from out-of-pocket liability, the most significant interventions were based on empowering shareholders to decide whether to shield insiders from liability. Also, Delaware consistently refrains from amending the DGCL to alter the substance of directors' fiduciary duties.

We then focus on the frequency of legislative amendments and the dynamic underlying them. Even when they addressed important legal questions, legislative reactions to court decisions were rarely controversial. Indeed, the relatively harmonious nature of the interactions between Delaware's courts and the Council can explain why this decades-long pattern has largely been overlooked by corporate law scholars. The 2024 amendments, however, took a different turn. We use our sample to highlight the unusual process leading to the 2024 amendments.[33] We also find that legislative responses take place with increasing frequency and have become more likely to override courts' rulings. These findings, we argue, reinforce the need for additional research concerning the contemporary forces underlying the interaction between Delaware's judiciary and Council.

While we do not take a stand on the *Moelis* controversy, we argue that it underscores an inevitable challenge facing a regime based on *ex-post* adjudication. On the one hand, courts should invalidate unlawful governance norms, and they should do so even when a governance innovation has become widespread. On the other hand, courts are limited in their capacity to address the market-wide implications of invalidating governance norms that have become prevalent, and the pressure for a legislative intervention increases.

Before proceeding, two clarifications are in order. First, while our analysis explains how legislative responses can address the challenges facing a jurisdiction that relies on courts to develop corporate law norms, we do not take a position on the desirability of each amendment. Nor do we argue that this dynamic provides the optimal balance between the interests of managers, shareholders, and other constituencies.

Second, Delaware has a unique process of amending its corporate statute: the Council of the Corporation Law Section of the DSBA, which is composed of Delaware lawyers, identifies needed legislative changes and annually proposes DGCL amendments. The General Assembly approves these

[33] *See infra,* Section III.C.

proposed amendments without substantial changes.[34] Proponents of this architecture posit that it enables a professional and responsive legislative process and that it protects Delaware's corporate law from narrow, local interests.[35] Opponents believe that this process gives too much power to the practitioners who sit on the Council and to their clients at the expense of elected politicians.[36] For ease of exposition, we often refer to the "Delaware legislature" although we acknowledge the minimal role that the General Assembly's normally plays in the legislative process of Delaware corporate law.

The Article proceeds as follows. Part I lays out the background to our discussion and presents the prevailing perspectives in the literature on the dominance of Delaware courts. Part II systematically analyzes the activity of the Delaware legislature in response to judicial decisions, exposing the major factors that trigger legislative interventions and presenting a comprehensive framework of this phenomenon. Part III explores several implications of our findings. Part IV examines several lessons of our study for institutional investors and future research.

I. The Prevailing Perspective on Delaware's Law

A. Delaware Dominance: The Building Blocks

Delaware is the global capital of corporate law and the leader in attracting incorporations, especially of publicly traded companies.[37] Its corporate laws inspire other states and serve as a benchmark for lawmakers around the world.[38]

Some view Delaware as the winner in a 'race to the top,' attracting incorporations by offering laws that strike an optimal balance between management and shareholders.[39] Critics, however, contend that Delaware's dominance reflects a 'race to the bottom,' with laws that predominantly favor managers.[40] Others argue that Delaware faces little serious competition from other states,[41] and that it

---

[34] *See infra* Subsection I.A

[35] Leo E. Strine, *The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face,* 30 DEL. J. CORP. L., 673, 680 (2005) (explaining that "our state will not tilt its corporation law to favor a corporation that happens to have its headquarters here"); Ofer Eldar & Gabriel Rauterberg, *Is Corporate Law Nonpartisan?*, WIS. L. REV. 177, 181 (2023) ("The major arms of Delaware corporate lawmaking—the legislative process and the courts—have both been carefully immunized from the normal political fray").

[36] See *infra* notes 257-259, 264, and accompanying text.

[37] *See, e.g.*, Lynn M. LoPucki, *Corporate Charter Competition*, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2101, 2102 (2019) ("Delaware's competitors have lagged so far behind that some scholars have declared the competition to be over and Delaware the winner."); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, *The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law*, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 684 (2002) ("Other than Delaware, no state is engaged in significant efforts to attract incorporations of public companies."); Marcel Kahan, *Delaware's Peril*, 80 MD. L. REV. 59, 61 (2021) ("Delaware accounts for the bulk of incorporations."). As of 2022, nearly 70 percent of the Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in Delaware, and the state attracted about 80 percent of the IPOs in that year. *See* Delaware Division of Corporations, 2022 ANNUAL REPORT, https://corp.delaware.gov/stats/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2024).

[38] *See, e.g.*, Hamermesh, *supra* note 12.

[39] *See, e.g.*, Ralph K. Winter, Jr., *State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation*, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254–58 (1977); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW, 212–27 (1991); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 14–31 (1993).

[40] *See, e.g.,* William L. Cary, *Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware*, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Lucian A. Bebchuk, *Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law*, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992); Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., *Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?*, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775 (2002). For a comprehensive review, *see* Marcel Kahan, *The State of State Competition for Incorporations Revisited* 19 (Working Paper, 2023).

[41] *See, e.g.,* Kahan & Kamar, *supra* note 37; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, *Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters*, 112 YALE L. J. 553, 563–64 (2002).

aims to provide "middle ground [rules] on the pro-manager/pro-shareholder dimension and otherwise focusing on maximizing quality."[42]

Despite this lack of consensus, there is general agreement that Delaware courts are a cornerstone of the state's success. The Court of Chancery—a specialized trial court for corporate matters[43]—adjudicates cases without a jury.[44] Delaware's judiciary is non-partisan, and judges are selected by a nominating commission based on merit and appointed for set terms.[45] The Court of Chancery's exclusive focus on business cases enables quicker hearings and timely decisions.[46]

Consequently, the Court of Chancery has built a substantial body of precedents that provide guidance for market participants.[47] Delaware judges are renowned for establishing corporate law norms by applying fiduciary duty standards across a broad spectrum of corporate contexts.[48] As Rock observed, these judges conduct a detailed examination of directors' performance and the way they discharge their duties, and through that "exercise," they set norms and offer guidance to directors.[49]

Inspired by the Delaware model, other states, including Nevada and (now) Texas, have attempted to establish their own specialized courts.[50] The World Bank's 2012 "Doing Business" report noting that at least 23 economies established specialized courts.[51] However, many jurisdictions have encountered financial, political, and constitutional hurdles,[52] and none have matched Delaware's preeminence in corporate law or company incorporations.[53]

---

[42] Kahan, *The State of State Competition, supra* note 40, at 26. *See also* William Magnuson, *The Race to the Middle*, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183 (2020).

[43] *See, e.g.*, LoPucki, *supra* note 37, at 2102 ("The Delaware Court of Chancery, which interprets and enforces the Delaware General Corporation Law, is the American court most specialized in corporate law."). *See also* Randy J. Holland, *Delaware Corporation Law: Judiciary, Executive, Legislature, Practitioners*, 72 BUSINESS LAWYER 943, 952–54 (2017); Kahan & Rock, *Symbiotic Federalism, supra* note 11, at 1602.

[44] Hamermesh, *supra* note 12, at 1759–762.

[45] *See, e.g.,* Jill E. Fisch, *The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters*, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061 (2000) (Delaware judges "enjoy a high degree of political independence"); Demetrios G. Kaouris, *Is Delaware Still a Haven for Incorporation*, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 965, 975–77 (1995); Rock, *Saints and Sinners*, *supra* note 20 (explaining that Delaware's judges are "experienced and respected practitioners" who are selected based on merit).

[46] Kaouris, *supra* note 45, at 975–77.

[47] One observer argues that the unique combination of specialized judges, efficient case handling of M&A litigation, and a robust body of precedents allows the Delaware courts to recreate the policymaking toolbox of a modern regulatory agency. *See* William Savitt, *The Genius of the Modern Chancery System*, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 570 (2012). *See also* Omari Scott Simmons, *Branding the Small Wonder: Delaware's Dominance and the Market for Corporate Law*, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1129 (2008); Stephen M. Bainbridge, *DExit Drivers: Is Delaware's Dominance Threatened?*, 54-61 (UCLA Working Paper, 2024).

[48] Fisch, *supra* note 45, at 1074 ("[D]espite their statutory source, the majority of Delaware's important legal rules are the result of judicial decisions.").

[49] *See* Rock, *Saints and Sinners*, *supra* note 20, at 1098–99.

[50] *See* Sujeet Indap, *Texas is throwing down a legal challenge to Delaware*, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2024), https://www.ft.com/content/a02b96df-9ee1-4b3b-a31e-087b734840a1; Michal Barzuza, *Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Liability-Free Jurisdiction*, 99 VA. L. REV. 935 (2012).

[51] *See* Yifat Aran & Moran Ofir, *The Effect of Specialized Courts over Time*, *in* TIME, LAW, AND CHANGE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY 167 (Sofia Ranchordás & Yaniv Roznai eds., 2020). For example, in 2010, Israel joined this global movement by setting up an Economic Division within the Tel Aviv District Court.

[52] LoPucki, *supra* note 37, at 2102, n. 4 (describing Nevada's and New York's challenges in establishing business courts); Bernard S. Black, *Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis*, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 589-90 (1990) (describing how New York considered competing with Delaware, and concluded that the effort was futile); Kahan, *Delaware's Peril*, *supra* note 37, at 66 (describing the political constraints other states face).

[53] See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, *Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Re-considering the Competition over Corporate Charters*, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 563–64 (2002) (arguing that Delaware's dominant position imposes insurmountable barriers to entry).

Legal scholarship also examines, albeit to a lesser extent, Delaware's distinct process of corporate law legislation.[54] While the General Assembly approves amendments to the DGCL, substantive drafting is managed by the Council that governs the Corporation Law Section of the DSBA (the "Council").[55] The Council is composed of Delaware corporate law practitioners offering a blend of litigation and transactional expertise, with some members of the plaintiff bar.[56] It considers proposed legislation in private sessions that are often prompted by the Council's members interaction with their clients.[57] The Council identifies the need for legislative changes.[58] Once approved by the full Corporation Law Section, the proposals are advanced to the General Assembly, where they typically receive expedited attention and pass unanimously.[59]

Proponents of this structure posit that it fosters a professional legislative process and well-informed policy formulation.[60] The Council's non-partisan nature arguably underscores Delaware's commitment to a professional approach to lawmaking.[61] As a former Delaware Supreme Court justice observed, "the characteristics of the Council and its internal process are what contribute to the successful development of Delaware's corporation law."[62]

B. The Limited Role of Legislation

Until recently, the common view has been that Delaware's legislature plays a largely passive role, focusing primarily on technical amendments.[63] The legislature has been described as a "little more than a bit player," with its contributions since the significant 1967 overhaul of the DGCL characterized as modest and incremental.[64] As noted, "[t]he most noteworthy trait of Delaware's corporate law is

---

[54] *See, e.g.*, Simmons, *supra* note 47, at 1157–58 (arguing states replicating Delaware's statutes fail to attract corporations because "Delaware's Corporate Bar, an expert group, has unmatched authority in the corporation law amendment process compared to other states.").

[55] *See, e.g.*, Roberta Romano, *Market for Corporate Law Redux, in* THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 358, 361–62 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017) (explaining how the Delaware legislature responds to the bar by enacting its proposed initiatives).

[56] Hamermesh, *supra* note 12, at 1752–59; Holland, *supra* note 43, at 947; ROMANO, *supra* note 39, at 37-38. For a famous critique of the composition of the committee, which consists chiefly attorneys representing corporations, *see* Ernest Folk, *Review of the Delaware Corporation Law: Some Reflections of a Corporation Law Draftsman*, 42 CONN. B.J. 409 (1968). The Corporation Law Section consists of "more than 500 Delaware attorneys, judges and academics" (*Corporation Law Section, About the Section*, https://www.dsba.org/sections-committees/sections-of-the-bar/corporation-law/).

[57] Holland, *supra* note 43, at 948.

[58] Hamermesh, *supra* note 12*,* at 1756–57; Romano, *supra* note 55.

[59] Kaouris, *supra* note 45, at 971–72; Romano, *supra* note 55.

[60] Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, *Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law*, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 488-489 (1987) ("Delaware legislature's drafting committees historically have been staffed with attorneys experienced in corporate law"); Fisch, *supra* note 45, at 1089 ("[T]he Delaware legislature has traditionally been very responsive to corporate requests for rulemaking.").

[61] Kahan & Rock, *Symbiotic Federalism, supra* note 11, at 1600 ("[Delaware's] legislators claim no expertise over corporate law, and partisan politics play no role in its formation."); Hamermesh, *supra* note 12, at 1753 ("[T]he Delaware General Assembly has not perceived the content of the DGCL as an appropriate subject for partisan controversy."); Holland, *supra* note 43, at 949 ("[T]here is simply no political element to the development of corporation law.").

[62] Holland, *supra* note 43, at 949.

[63] Brian R. Cheffins, *Delaware and the Transformation of Corporate Governance*, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 23 (2015) ("Delaware courts have done much more to influence corporate governance than the Delaware legislature"); Simmons, *supra* note 47, at 1158 ("[Actual] changes to the … DGCL… over the past forty years have been conservative. This conservatism results in deference to the judicial branch to incrementally sketch corporate law"); LoPucki, *supra* note 37, at 2102 ("Delaware's competitive strategy is principally judicial, not legislative.").

[64] Cheffins, *supra* note 63, at 17–18 ("[T]he Delaware legislature was destined to be little more than a bit player as corporate governance developed over the past forty years."); Simmons, *supra* note 47, at 1158 n. 127 ("arguing that "Many of the statutory changes have been technical, and very few have attracted any academic attention.").

the extent to which important and controversial legal rules are promulgated by the judiciary, rather than enacted by the legislature."[65] For example, in their analysis of hostile takeover rules, Armour and Skeel observed that in the United States, "the principal decision-makers are Congress and the Delaware courts."[66]

Kahan and Rock suggest that Delaware's division of labor between its legislation and the judiciary is strategic: by delegating the task of refining corporate laws to the courts, Delaware avoids the perils of enacting confrontational laws that could provoke federal interference or public backlash.[67] Others posit that Delaware's preference for judge-made law fosters ambiguity, which benefits the state's legal professionals by increasing demand for their services.[68] Hamermesh, however, suggests that the deference to the judiciary reflects a preference for incremental legislation and broad statutory frameworks. He argues that complex legal matters are better resolved through judicial interpretation than legislation.[69] Other scholars have highlighted that Delaware's heavy reliance on judicial lawmaking enhances the political independence of corporate law-making,[70] which is essential for attracting incorporations.[71]

While scholars recognize that judicial decisions can spur legislative responses,[72] they have not studied the patterns underlying these interventions. Skeel, for example, analyzes two instances in 2009 and 2015 where Delaware's General Assembly responded to court decisions.[73] He emphasizes the rarity of this legislative response, and argues that it is unlikely to become commonplace given the need to maintain the credibility of Delaware's judiciary.[74] Only after the 2024 amendments, questions regarding the appropriate scope of legislative intervention took center stage in corporate legal debates.[75]

Our analysis sheds new light on the role of legislation in Delaware's corporate law. We document a decades-long pattern of legislative responses to court decisions and show that Delaware

---

[65] *See* Kahan & Rock, *Symbiotic Federalism, supra* note 11, at 1591.

[66] Armour & Skeel, *supra* note 11.

[67] Kahan & Rock, *Symbiotic Federalism, supra* note 11.

[68] *See, e.g.*, Kamar, *supra* note 16, at 1908 (explaining that the use of standards makes it harder for other states to replicate Delaware law); Macey & Miller, *supra* note 60 (examining the powerful role of lawyers as an interest group in Delaware and how they may lead to deviations from profit-maximizing strategies).. Some argue that the courts' maintenance of vague standards aims to maintain their power and bolster their prestige. *See, e.g.*, Stephen M. Bainbridge, *Interest Group Analysis of Delaware Law: The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine as Case Study*, *in* CAN DELAWARE BE DETHRONED?: EVALUATING DELAWARE'S DOMINANCE OF CORPORATE LAW 120 (Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., 2018).

[69] Hamermesh, *supra* note 12, at 1777.

[70] *See e.g.,* Fisch, *supra* note 45, at 1099, and the various sources in *supra* note 35.

[71] *See e.g.,* Eldar & Rauterberg, *supra note* 35. For empirical evidence on the value investors attribute to the independence of Delaware judiciary, *see* Brian Feinstein & Daniel Hemel, *The Market Value of Partisan Balance*, 119 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2025).

[72] *See, e.g.,* William B. Chandler, III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., *The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State*, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 982 (2003) (Delaware's court decisions "provide feedback to policymakers that stimulates later amendments to the rules").

[73] These cases will be discussed below. *See infra* notes 184–188, 195–200.

[74] Skeel, *supra* note 15, at 10–11. *See also* Bainbridge, *supra* note 68, at 120–44 (analyzing the corporate opportunity doctrine as another instance of Delaware legislature's intervention, describing it as "one of those rare cases in which the Delaware legislature has intervened to provide greater predictability and certainty than the courts have offered")

[75] *See, e.g.,* Macey, *supra* note 5, as well as the sources in *supra* note 7.

systematically uses legislative amendments to address the potential challenges of a corporate law regime that relies heavily on courts to develop and enforce norms.[76]

II. Legislative Responses to Court Decisions: 1967-2024

This Part presents our study of DGCL amendments enacted between 1967 and 2024 in response to court decisions. Section A discusses the methodology we use to identify these amendments and describes our key findings. Section B presents a framework to categorize the legislative responses in our sample. We identify the challenges that inevitably arise when a legal system relies on the judiciary to create corporate law norms and explain how legislative responses can address these challenges. Finally, Section C provides detailed analyses of some examples of past legislative responses.

A. Methodology and Findings

We reviewed all amendments to the DCGL between 1967 and 2024 to identify legislation that responds to court rulings. For each amendment, we documented the court ruling that appeared to prompt the change as well as the nature (override, conform, clarify, other) and timing of the legislative response (the time between the court decision and legislation). A list of these amendments appears in Appendix A.

Identifying the amendments that responded to court rulings is challenging because the Council's work proceeds privately. The Council does not release detailed minutes of the discussions preceding legislative amendments, and the explanations it provides for these amendments are often very brief.[77] To better understand the background of legislative amendments and their relationship to judicial decisions, we examined commentaries on amendments to the DCGL published annually by two prominent Delaware law firms, Young Conaway and Morris Nichols.[78] In some instances, we managed to uncover additional information about the legislative amendments. This was the case, for example, with the substantial amendment to the DGCL in 1967, or the exceptional instances when the Council did publish explanatory reports on the legislative amendment.

We include in our sample only those amendments for which our reading of the legislative history through law firms' analyses, the Corporate Law Section's reports, or scholarly writing clearly indicates that legislation responded to court rulings. Moreover, we limit our sample to amendments to Delaware's Corporations statute, the DGCL. We did not study amendments to statutes governing other business entities, such as LLCs.

Our methodology has several limitations in capturing the full dynamics between courts and legislation. Due to the limited availability of legislative history, we may have overlooked some legislative amendments responding to court decisions. While we focus on legislative actions, we cannot discount the possibility that the courts' awareness of potential legislative responses influences their decisions. For example, courts may narrow the scope of their rulings to avoid prompting legislative reaction. Conversely, they may issue broader decisions although they may create difficulties for

---

[76] *See* Bainbridge, *DExit Drivers, supra* note 47 (explaining how the swift legislative response of the 2024 amendments illustrates Delaware's advantage in maintaining a modern corporate law framework); Mark Lebovitch, *Soap Opera Summer: Five Predictions About DGCL 122(18)'s Effect on Delaware Law and Practice* 3–4 (Working Paper, 2024) (arguing that the *Moelis* amendment will alter the relationship among the Delaware Bench and Bar). None of these works, however, provides a systemic examination of legislative interventions in Delaware.

[77] Hamermesh, *supra* note 12, at 1755-56 ("There is a strongly held tradition that preliminary or potential legislative proposals are not to be discussed with or disseminated to persons outside the firms represented on the Council.").

[78] UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA CAREY LAW SCHOOL, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW, https://www.law.upenn.edu/delawarecorporatehistory/dgcl.php/

practitioners, expecting the legislature to provide clarifications or adjustments. We also do not examine how courts reacted to legislative interventions. Arlen, for example, demonstrates how Delaware courts developed the *Caremark* doctrine around the bad faith exception to 102(b)(7).[79]

How frequent are legislative responses to courts' decisions in Delaware? Have these interventions become more frequent over time? How fast does the legislature react? Are legislative amendments consistent with courts' position (for example, responding to judges' remarks calling for legislative amendments to clarify rules) or do they override court decisions?

Frequency. We find a pattern of legislative responses that is more common than previously recognized. During our study period (from 1967–2024), we find 41 legislative responses (an average of 0.68 per year). We also find that the frequency of legislative responses has increased in recent years. In the 2000s (2000–2024), the average rises to 0.92 per year, compared to 0.53 per year in the earlier period. In the past five years, we have documented 6 legislative responses (an average of 1.2 per year).

Timing. On average, legislative responses in our sample occurred 5.5 years after the court decision, with the median time gap being 1.5 years.[80] There has often been a notable gap between court decisions and legislative responses. Excluding the 2024 amendments (which are a clear outlier), about 80% of the amendments in our sample occurred at least a year after the court decision. For instance, the enactment of Section 102(b)(7) arrived approximately 1.5 years after the *Van Gorkom* decision. Similarly, legislative action regarding fee-shifting bylaws occurred about 13 months after the court's decision.[81] The high-profile legislation involving Section 203 (Delaware antitakeover rule) underwent a rigorous review process that included about 150 comment letters, substantive revisions and an additional round of circulation and comments.[82] In less pressing matters, legislative action sometimes occurred years later. For example, the amendment regarding corporate opportunities came a decade after the court decision.[83]

Type of Legislative Responses. For each amendment, we used our sources' description to determine whether the amendment aimed at overriding court decisions, conforming the statute to the rulings, clarifying them or otherwise addressing their consequences. We realize the inherent limitations of this classification,[84] and we use it only to illustrate how contemporary commentators perceived the nature of the legislation. We found that 46% of the amendments clarified confusing rules or standards created by courts; 20% aligned the DGCL with existing case law; and 7% addressed the consequences of court decisions without directly challenging them. Only 27% of the responses in our sample directly override court decisions. When examining the period from 2000 to 2024, the rate of overrides increases significantly to 36% (compared to the earlier period's 9%).

Voting Records. Data we manually collected on the voting records of the amendments to the DGCL from 1998 to 2023 show that the legislative process in the General Assembly is marked by a

---

[79] Jennifer Arlen, *The Story of Allis-Chalmers, Caremark and Stone: Directors' Evolving Duty to Monitor*, *in* CORPORATE LAW STORIES 323 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009).

[80] *See* Appendix A.

[81] *Id.*

[82] This process included feedback from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Federal Trade Commission, corporate lawyers and various stakeholders. *See* Curtis Alva, *Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency*, 15 DEL J. CORP. L. 885, 906 (1990); Hamermesh, *supra* note 12, at 1779 ("Section 203 is unique in its adoption: It was intentionally exposed for public comment, received plenty, and was the subject of extensive legislative hearings").

[83] *See* Appendix A.

[84] For example, the synopsis may state that the amendment is clarifies existing case law while a careful reading may suggest that the amendment overrides the ruling.

consensus on corporate legislation.[85] In nearly all instances, these amendments were passed unanimously or with only one dissenting vote, highlighting the broad bipartisan support they typically receive. This also includes amendments that insulated insiders from liability. Until the 2024 amendments, only one substantive amendment that deals with a substantive corporate law issue—the *fee-shifting* amendment—encountered opposition from several (Republican) members who seemingly wanted stricter limitations on litigation.[86]

B. *Legislation and the Challenges of Judge-Made Corporate Law*

The legislative amendments in our sample encompass various aspects of Delaware corporate law. Nevertheless, we argue that these legislative responses can be interpreted as addressing the inherent challenges that arise from Delaware's reliance on courts to establish corporate law norms. In this Section, we offer a framework that summarizes these challenges. Some of the challenges we identify are unique to corporate law. Others apply more broadly to other areas that rely on common law to develop norms. In the next Section, we analyze in detail several examples from our sample to show how legislative responses have addressed these challenges. Our list of challenges is not mutually exclusive, and the legislative amendments we discuss in this Part could be understood as responding to more than one challenge.

1. Setting Norms vs. Out-of-Pocket Liability

The first challenge is closely related to corporate law's reluctance to subject insiders to out-of-pocket liability for business decisions. Delaware courts establish norms through the adjudication of specific disputes. Courts are both guided by indeterminate fiduciary standards and are continuously shaping these standards.[87] The development of Delaware's corporate law depends on private litigation.[88] Class actions and derivative lawsuits typically challenge decisions made by directors and seek *monetary damages* for alleged financial losses caused by their actions. Shareholder litigation is largely driven by attorneys whose incentives are tied to fees they can secure, which are frequently proportional to the monetary compensation awarded by the court.[89]

---

[85] Data is on file with the authors.

[86] Two other amendments (related to annual fee increases) faced some resistance, but they did not pertain to substantive corporate law issues. See House Bill 519 from the 144th General Assembly (2007-2008) and House Bill 267 from the 142nd General Assembly (2003-2004). Moreover, in 2023, state Rep. Madinah Wilson-Anton challenged proposed changes to the DGCL that "allowed corporations to dilute the voting power of retail investors in corporate decision-making" by changing the standard by which votes are counted. In an attempt to block the proposed bill, Wilson-Anton proposed another amendment that was defeated on the last day of the General Assembly's 2023 session in an 11-29 vote in the House. *See* Jordan Howell, *Special Interests Pull Back on Delaware Corporate Law Changes After Wilson-Anton Amendment*, DELAWARE CALL (Jan. 22, 2024) https://delawarecall.com/2024/01/22/special-interests-pull-back-on-delaware-corporate-law-changes-after-wilson-anton-amendment/.

[87] Randy J. Holland, *Delaware Directors' Fiduciary Duties: The Focus on Loyalty*, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 675, 678 (2009) ("Delaware courts have tempered law with equity by recognizing that the directors' exercise of this statutory power to manage 'carries with it certain fundamental fiduciary obligations"); Rock, *Saints and Sinners, supra* note 20, at 1009 (Delaware fiduciary law guides good and bad governance through precedents and providing standards for director conduct over time).

[88] Holland, *supra* note 43, at 679. In some instances, other parties might bring a lawsuit. Some takeover cases, for example, were initiated by the bidder. *See, e.g.,* Ronald J. Gilson, *A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers*, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981).

[89] *See, e.g.*, Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, *The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform*, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991).

However, a fundamental principle of modern corporate law is that directors are shielded from out-of-pocket liability for business decisions and other conduct that does not amount to self-dealing.[90] Imposing liability for poor judgment could discourage qualified individuals from board service, encourage excessive risk aversion and dissuade directors from pursuing risky initiatives that could benefit the corporation.[91]

The reliance on shareholder litigation for judicial lawmaking is, therefore, in clear tension with the reluctance to subject directors to out-of-pocket liability for non-conflicted decisions.[92] Delaware legislature has continuously addressed this tension: Judicial decisions are perceived as raising the bar of expectations for directors, thereby leading to market-wide concerns about out-of-pocket exposure or the unavailability of mechanisms to insulate corporate leaders from such exposure. Legislation responds not by changing the standards for director conduct, but by providing new mechanisms for companies to shield insiders from out-of-pocket liability.

A related pattern is legislative amendments that remove uncertainties around the use of legal arrangements insulating insiders from out-of-pocket liability, such as indemnification and liability insurance. These amendments were prompted by court rulings that highlighted vulnerabilities in these protective mechanisms, rather than by courts establishing new norms.

This dynamic can be interpreted in different ways: as the capture of the Delaware legislature by managerial interests or as responding to investors' interest in attracting qualified directors and encouraging them to take calculated risks. We do not take a stand. Our objective here is largely descriptive—to illuminate (with examples provided below) how Delaware's intricate regime of protections against out-of-pocket liability has evolved through the ongoing interplay between Delaware's legislature and its judiciary.

2. Fiduciary Tailoring

Delaware courts principally use fiduciary duties as their doctrinal toolkit for shaping corporate law across a wide range of settings, including hostile takeovers, shareholder activism, friendly sales, related-party transactions and bylaw amendments. Fiduciary duties—the duty of loyalty and the duty of care—govern the conduct of directors and controlling shareholders.[93] The courts' reliance on fiduciary duties imposes two limitations on their ability to shape corporate law.

---

[90] *See, e.g.,* Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, *Outside Director Liability*, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1077 (2006) ("[S]o long an outside director has not engaged in self-dealing, the scope of potential out-of-pocket liability is very narrow.").

[91] *See* Assaf Hamdani & Reinier Kraakman, *Rewarding Outside Directors,* 105 MICH. L. REV. 1677, 1689 (2007) (explaining that subjecting directors to liability might lead to "agency cost of risk-distorted decision-making by the board, and … a diminished pool of candidates from which to recruit new directors."); Holger Spamann, *Monetary Liability for Breach of the Duty of Care?* 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 337, 339 (2016) (the threat of full liability might make directors refuse to serve or demand a large risk premium.).

[92] As Kamar observes, this tension could explain the role of indemnification and D&O liability insurance. Ehud Kamar, *Shareholder Litigation under Indeterminate Corporate Law*, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 888 (1999) (argues that "[I]nsurance and indemnification can be a socially desirable mechanism that induces plaintiffs to sue yet keeps sanctions low"). Our analysis assumes that out-of-pocket liability is not required for courts to set norms. One could argue, however, that new norms would be more effective if they were accompanied by out-of-pocket liability.

[93] The duty of loyalty obliges directors to prioritize the interests of the corporation and its shareholders above their own, thereby preventing conflicts of interest and self-dealing. The duty of care requires directors to act with the diligence and prudence that a reasonably careful person would exercise in comparable circumstances. Holland, *supra* note 43, at 678. *See also Totta V. CCSB Financial Corp*., 2022 WL 1751741, at *15.

First, courts lack the power to subject fiduciary obligations to private ordering. Delaware's corporate law provides corporations with significant flexibility to tailor governance arrangements to their specific needs.[94] Fiduciary duties, however, are mandatory, creating tension with the principle of private ordering.[95]

Without legislative authorization, corporations cannot waive, contract around, or modify fiduciary duties to align with their business needs. Similarly, courts lack the authority to prefer private ordering over fiduciary duties. They will not uphold charter provisions or shareholder agreements that modify fiduciary duties without a basis in the statute. Only legislation can reassign an issue from the realm of fiduciary obligations to that of private ordering.[96] Legislative action in this area often responds to court decisions that either cast doubt on the permissibility of private ordering or highlight the need to allow parties to contract around fiduciary duties.

The second limitation on courts' ability to shape corporate law arises from the nearly *universal application* of fiduciary duties. Delaware courts apply the same doctrines—the duty of care and the duty of loyalty—across a wide range of cases. Courts are limited in their ability to tailor the legal interpretation of fiduciary duties to the nuanced realities of specific settings. This is because the courts' interpretation of the requirements entailed by fiduciary duties in one setting may affect other, even if unrelated, corporate settings. Consider the principle that contractual arrangements cannot prevent fiduciaries from discharging their fiduciary obligations.[97] Delaware courts have invalidated bylaws and other contractual arrangements seeking to constrain directors from exercising their judgment in accordance with their fiduciary duties.[98] This nearly universal rule can lead to suboptimal outcomes when precommitment is desirable. The legislature, in contrast, is not subject to these constraints. It can adopt statutory arrangements tailored to specific settings without the risk that these amendments will cause unintended consequences in other, unrelated areas of corporate law.

3. Courts' Institutional Limitations

Our analysis thus far has focused on considerations unique to Delaware's corporate law. Academic literature, however, has explored the broader constraints of courts and comparative advantages of legislation in producing legal norms.[99] Courts face inherent limitations that restrict their

---

[94] *New Enter. Assocs. 14 v. Rich*, 295 A.3d 520 (Del. Ch. 2023) ("To say that Delaware prides itself on the contractarian nature of its law risks understatement."). See also Romano, *The Genius of American Corporate Law*, *supra* note 56, at 14–31; David Rosenberg, *Making Sense of Good Faith in Delaware Corporate Fiduciary Law: A Contractarian Approach*, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 491 (2004) ("Delaware is the most contractarian jurisdiction.").

[95] *New Enter. Assocs. 14 v. Rich*, 295 A.3d 520 (Del. Ch. 2023) (Describes the conflict between the "dual principles" of Delaware corporate law: private ordering and fiduciary accountability).

[96] *Id.,* at 528 ("[I]f the General Assembly has authorized provisions in the constitutive documents of an entity that eliminate or modify the fiduciary duty regime, then a court will enforce them. Otherwise, practitioners cannot use the constitutive documents of an entity for that purpose."); *Totta v. CCSB Financial Corp., supra* note 93, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2022) ("[T]he constitutive agreements that govern an entity can only eliminate or modify fiduciary duties … to the extent expressly permitted by an affirmative act of the Delaware General Assembly."). *See also* Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, *Opting out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians*, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 6, 19, 28 (1990).

[97] *See, e.g., Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro*, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291 (Del. 1998) ("to the extent that a contract, or a provision thereof, purports to require a board to act or not act in such a fashion as to limit the exercise of fiduciary duties, it is invalid and unenforceable.").

[98] Courts have also viewed such arrangements as inconsistent with Section 141(a) of the DGCL. *See* most recently, the *Moelis* case, *supra* note 4. Under this approach, such an arrangement can be valid only if expressly authorized in the company's articles of association.

[99] *See, e.g.*, Michael A. Bailey et al., *The Amorphous Relationship between Congress and the Courts*, *in* THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS (Eric Schickler & Frances E. Lee. eds., 2011); Thomas M. Keck, *The Relationship Between*

capacity for legal reform, including adherence statutory law and the narrow scope of specific legal disputes at hand.[100] The Delaware Chancery court, it is argued, benefits from expert judges who exercise flexibility and demonstrate responsiveness in ways that resemble legislative processes.[101] Even expert courts, however, are subject to the judiciary's institutional limitations. We focus on three constraints that even expert judges, with a deep understanding of market-wide implications, cannot overcome.

First, courts have limited ability to strike "political" compromises that require reconciling competing interests across multiple legal questions. This limitation does not stem from judges' lack of competence to consider the market-wide implications of their decisions. Delaware judges are widely regarded as experts on corporate law matters who are capable of incorporating policy considerations into their decisions. This argument also departs from the view that legislatures, as majoritarian institutions, are better equipped to address political concerns, while courts are designed to serve other purposes, such as protecting minority rights.[102] Rather, it is the requirement that courts address the specific dispute at hand that limits their ability to craft solutions that require the adjustment of arrangements across *multiple* legal issues. To be clear, we do not claim that legislation will achieve the optimal balance among stakeholder groups. Rather, we argue that the legislature has the tools to undertake this balancing effort.

Second, courts must wait for a specific dispute to resolve errors or uncertainty arising from prior holdings. Practitioners in Delaware look to court decisions and judicial remarks for guidance. Courts' application of open-ended standards to specific settings can create uncertainty. Even expert judges cannot fully anticipate how their decisions will be interpreted by the business community. The reactive nature of the judiciary, which must wait for cases to be brought, limits its ability to proactively change rules, correct judicial errors, or resolve ambiguities in interpretation.[103]

A related concern is the potential emergence of undesirable *sticky rules*—legal norms that persist even after their original rationale has become obsolete.[104] Rules established through court decisions may remain in force even when there is consensus that they would likely not be upheld if challenged in court. This occurs because market participants are hesitant to incur the risks associated with contesting these rules in litigation. Courts can only refine or modify previous rulings when the relevant legal issues are brought before them. However, market participants tend to prioritize

---

Courts and Legislatures, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (Lee Epstein & Stefanie A. Lindquist eds., 2017); MARK C. MILLER, THE VIEW OF THE COURTS FROM THE HILL: INTERACTIONS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 21 (University of Virginia Press, 2009).

[100] *See* Fisch, *supra* note 45, at 1072–82; Christopher J. Peters, *Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis*, 105 YALE L.J. 2031, 2036 (1996).

[101] Fisch, *supra* note 45, at 1072–82.

[102] *See, e.g.*, Frank B. Cross, *Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights*, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1529 (2000).

[103] Fisch, *supra* note 45, at 1072 ("Courts, unlike legislatures, generally cannot initiate legal change but must wait for litigants to commence an action."); Kahan & Rock, *Symbiotic Federalism, supra* note 11, at 1576 (suggesting that Delaware's "classical model of lawmaking entails some intrinsic limitations, including that legal change is slow, standard-based, and incremental."). The slow evolution of law in Delaware also has its advantages. *See*, for example, Frank B. Cross, *Book Review: What Do Judges Want? How Judges Think By Richard A. Posner. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008)*, 87 TEX. L. REV. 183, 222–24 (2008) ("The Chancery Court incrementally develops its law through judicial processes, which leaves "some residual uncertainty" that is valuable because it "allows space for the judiciary to pull back in future cases if a prior decision turns out, in the wake of experience, to have been unwise.").

[104] Brett McDonnell, *Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law*, 60 S.M.U. L. REV. 383 (2007); Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, *On the Stickiness of Default Rules*, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651 (2006).

structuring transactions in ways that minimize litigation and uncertainty, rather than contributing to the incremental refinement of Delaware law. Legislation is free of these constraints.[105]

Finally, courts cannot revise statutory rules, and this may restrict their ability to adapt to rapidly evolving mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and litigation practices. The legislature, in contrast, can modify statutory provisions to respond to judicial or market developments.

C. Examples

1. Out of Pocket Liability

Director and Officer Exculpation. Perhaps the most famous legislative response to a court ruling in corporate law is the enactment of the director exculpation provision in the aftermath of *Smith v. Van Gorkom.*[106] In that seminal 1985 case, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that the Trans Union directors had breached the duty of care by approving the sale of the company with minimal discussion and information.[107] By applying and arguably shaping fiduciary duties, the decision transformed the norms concerning M&A practices.[108]

This change, however, came with the perceived cost of increased exposure to out-of-pocket liability. The decision sparked concern that it had weakened the protection directors previously enjoyed under the "business judgment rule." D&O insurance premiums surged, fueling fears of an insurance crisis.[109] There were also claims about "an exodus of talented directors and potential directors from corporations" due to the enhanced litigation risk and the threat of liability.[110]

Delaware responded by enacting Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL in 1986.[111] The new provision did not provide a statutory definition of the duty of care or the business judgment rule. Rather, it allowed companies to adopt charter amendments to exempt directors from monetary liability for

---

[105] *See, generally*, Peters, *supra* note 100, at 2081–83 (legislative bodies have powers to address multiple different areas of law, all at one time, and the authority to replace an outdated or obstructive statutory scheme, producing more just, coherent, and effective law). JEB BARNES, OVERRULED? LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES, PLURALISM, AND CONTEMPORARY COURT-CONGRESS RELATIONS 34 (Stanford University Press, 2004) (discussing the role of the legislature in updating or revising statutes based on changing technology, science, and markets l).

[106] *Smith v. Van Gorkom*, *supra* note 10, at 866.

[107] *Id.*, at 864.

[108] *See, e.g.,* Rock, *Saints and Sinners*, *supra* note 20; Charles M. Elson, *The Duty of Care, Compensation and Stock Ownership,* 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 649, 677 (1995) (explaining that Van Gorkom "served to create a number of new and important guideposts to 'informed' [Board] decisionmaking").

[109] *See generally* Dennis J. Block et al., *Advising Directors on the D & O Insurance Crisis*, 14 SEC. REG, L. J. 130 (1986). *See also* Romano, *supra* note 55, at 361–62 (*Von Gorkom* "exacerbated managers—and investors—anxiety over the market trend: difficulty in obtaining insurance for directors who were confronted with heightened potential liability would render more difficult retention or recruitment of quality outside directors.").

[110] *Id. See also* Stephen P. Lamb, *Duty follows Function: Two Approaches to Curing the Mismatch between the Fiduciary Duties and Potential Personal Liability and Corporate Officers*, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 45, 53 (2012) (noting that difficulty of finding D&O insurance could lead to "an exodus of talented directors and potential directors from corporations unable to secure sufficient insurance – a phenomenon that was reported at the height of the D&O [directors and officers] crisis of the mid-1980s").

[111] S.B. 533, Gen. Assemb. 133rd, Reg. Sess. (Del. 1986); Lewis S. Black, Jr. & A. Gilchrist Sparks, III, *Analysis of the 1986 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law*, 311, 312 (July 1986).

breaches of duty of care.[112] In the year following this enactment, over 4,200 companies changed their charters to adopt the exculpation provision.[113]

The officer exculpation amendment is a more recent example of a legislative response to court developments that heightened the risk of liability for corporate insiders. Originally, Section 102(b)(7) applied only to directors.[114] Perhaps it was deemed unnecessary to exculpate officers because, until the 2003 amendment to Section 3114 of the DGCL, Delaware courts generally lacked personal jurisdiction over officers.[115] Even after 2003, fiduciary litigation targeting officers remained relatively uncommon.[116]

However, developments in merger litigation have increased officers' exposure to duty of care claims. In *Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings*,[117] the Delaware Supreme Court limited plaintiffs' ability to sue directors for post-closing damages when merger transactions were approved by an informed and uncoerced shareholder vote.[118] In the aftermath of *Corwin*, lawsuits started including duty-of-care claims against *officers*.

In *Morrison v. Berry*, for instance, the court declined to dismiss claims against the target's general counsel and chief executive officer, finding it reasonably plausible that these officers were grossly negligent in preparing the disclosure documents.[119] In *In re Mindbody, Inc.*, the court declined to dismiss duty of care claims against Mindbody's CFO because he had allegedly acted with gross negligence by obeying the CEO's instructions and tilting the sale process.[120] In *In re Baker Hughes Inc.,* the court found that the CEO may be subject to liability with respect to his signing the company's proxy statement.[121] And the court in *Roche* sustained claims against the CEO for an allegedly misleading proxy because she was involved in preparing the proxy.[122]

Critics portrayed these claims as nuisance claims that lead to expensive and time-consuming discovery that gave the plaintiffs leverage to extract a settlement.[123] Supporters of these claims, in

---

[112] Lamb, *Duty follows Function, supra* note 110 (the exculpation provision "was an attempt to restore protection that most corporate commentators, scholars, and practitioners understood to exist prior to the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom, rendered in 1985").

[113] 1 Delaware Corp. L. & Prac. § 6.02 n.55 (2023).

[114] Lamb, *supra* note 110; Richards, Layton & Finger, *2022 Proposed Amendments to the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware* (Apr. 21, 2022) https://www.rlf.com/2022-proposed-amendments-to-the-general-corporation-law-of-the-state-of-delaware; Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., *Optimizing the World's Leading Corporate Law: A Twenty-Year Retrospective and Look Ahead*, 77 BUS. LAW. 321, 364 (2022).

[115] When Section 102(b)(7) was adopted, directors were deemed to consent to service of process in the State of Delaware, but not officers. Therefore, non-resident officers could not be named as defendants in Delaware. Section 3114 was amended only in 2003 to include executive officers. Hamermesh et al., *id.*, at 365.

[116] In 2009, the Delaware Supreme Court held that officers owe the same fiduciary duties as directors. *See Gantler v. Stephens*, 965 A.2d 695, 708-09 (Del. 2009). That decision led a prominent Delaware judge to claim: "[t]he exclusion of officers from exculpation has so far been a sleeping dog, but, if and when it wakes, we believe it would be destructive to the rational incentive structures reclaimed and rebuilt after Van Gorkom."; Lamb, *supra* note 110.

[117] *Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC*, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015) (aff'ing In re KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 101 A.3d 980 (Del. Ch. 2014)).

[118] *Id.*

[119] *Morrison v. Berry*, No. 12802-VCG, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1412 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2019).

[120] *In re Mindbody, Inc. S'holders Litig.*, No. 2019-0442-KSJM, 2020 WL 5870084 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2020).

[121] *In re Baker Hughes Inc., Merger Litig.*, No. 2019-0638-AGB, 2020 WL 6281427 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 2020).

[122] *City of Warren Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys., v. Roche*, No. 2019-0740-PAF, 2020 WL 7023896 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2020).

[123] Hamermesh et al., 114, at 368–69 (arguing that "due care claims targeting officers are the latest result of the shareholder plaintiffs' bar's efforts to develop litigation tactics that offer potentially lucrative fee awards in the M&A field."). *See also* Edward B. Micheletti, *Recent Trends in Officer Liability*, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (Dec. 18, 2020),

contrast, contended that they often involved duty of loyalty violations (and not just due care claims) and that access to discovery made it easier to substantiate the loyalty claims.[124] We do not take a stand. Regardless of the reasons underlying these developments or their merits, they raised the specter of significant personal liability for officers—for whom the 102(b)(7) exculpation was unavailable.

In 2022, Delaware amended Section 102(b)(7) to allow corporations to include provisions in their certificate of incorporation exculpating officers from monetary liability for duty of care claims.[125] Officer exculpation applies only to *direct* (and not derivative) claims—the type of claims that are typical in M&A litigation.[126] In 2023, over 270 Delaware companies proposed amendments to their certificates of incorporation to exculpate their officers, and most of these proposals (85 percent) were successful.[127]

This example shows that Delaware tends to leave it to shareholders to decide about the scope of liability. After *Van Gorkom*, several states adopted "self-executing" arrangements that automatically apply to all corporations, without the need for a shareholder vote.[128] Delaware did not follow that path but conditioned exculpation of directors and officers on a shareholder vote.

Captive Insurance. In September 2021, the Delaware Chancery Court denied a motion to dismiss a derivative lawsuit against the Boeing Company's directors.[129] The court signaled its willingness to accept the allegations that Boeing's directors had failed to fulfill their oversight responsibilities, known as "*Caremark* duties,"[130] by neglecting to monitor the safety of the company's 737 Max airplanes.[131] That oversight lapse was linked to the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines crashes that resulted in the loss

---

https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2020/12/insights-the-delaware-edition/recent-trends-in-officer-liability; Richards, Layton & Finger, *supra* note 114.

[124] These cases often involved claims regarding duty of loyalty violations either because an officer acted under the influence of a controlling shareholder or because the officer had an interest in the sale of a company to a third party (for example, by securing continuing employment). *See* Joel Friedlander, *Thoughts of a Jewish-American Plaintiffs' Lawyer on the Past and Present of Stockholder Litigation*, 23 M&A J. 1, 4 (Nov./Dec. 2023).

[125] Ethan Klingsberg & Oliver Board, *DGCL Amendment Merits Amending Charters and Engagement with Institutional Shareholders*, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sep. 20, 2022) https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/09/04/dgcl-amendment-merits-amending-charters-and-engagement-with-institutional-shareholders/.

[126] A related amendment allowed the company to define which officers would be subject to the definition of "officer" in those sections of the DGCL that grant indemnification and reimbursement rights. That clause allows companies to cover a wider group of officers. H.B. 341, 150th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2020).

[127] Even failed proposals received an average support of 83% of the shares present; however, such support is insufficient if the corporation's charter required a supermajority vote or stockholder turnout was low. *See* Brian V. Breheny et al., *Officer Exculpation Under Delaware Law—Encouraging Results in Year One*, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June. 1, 2023) https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2023/06/01/officer-exculpation-under-delaware-law-encouraging-results-in-year-one/. *See also* Jens Frankenreiter & Eric L. Talley, Sticky Charters? *The Surprisingly Tepid Embrace of Officer-Protecting Waivers in* Delaware (ECGI Working Paper No. 762/2024) (showing that adoption of exculpatory provisions has not notably affected the companies' share prices).

[128] For states that adopted a self-executing arrangement, *see,* Fla. Stat. Ann. § 607.1645(1) (West Supp. 1988); Ind. Code Ann. § 23-1-35-1 (Bums Supp. 1987); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.307 (West Supp. 1988). Ohio statute had an "opt-out" provision; that is the statute is self-executing unless rejected by the corporation. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.59 (Anderson 1986) (as amended by H.B. No. 902, Laws of 1986). For an analysis of default arrangement in corporate law, *see* Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, *Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution*, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 489 (2002).

[129] *In re Boeing Co. Derivative Litig.*, No. 2019-0907-MTZ, 2021 WL 4059934 (Del. Ch. 2021).

[130] *In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig.*, 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). Oversight claims were considered difficult to plead because plaintiffs bear the high burden of showing that the directors acted in *bad faith*, by failing to implement any information system, or having implemented such a system, by ignoring "red flags" that the system brought to their attention. *See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter*, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).

[131] *See* note 129, *supra* at 2.

of 346 lives.[132] Not long afterward, the Boeing directors settled for $237.5 million, marking one of the largest settlements in the history of derivative lawsuits.[133]

This case received significant attention from the business press and the legal community.[134] It was the latest in a series of decisions in which the Delaware courts allowed *Caremark* claims–historically difficult to plead—to survive a motion to dismiss.[135] Law firms issued client alerts cautioning that "directors may be more exposed to [Caremark] claims more than they have been in the past," and advising on measures to reduce directors' exposure to personal liability for corporate traumas.[136] Corporate law scholars argued that this line of decisions marked a "new era" in which Delaware would impose enhanced duties on directors.[137]

The *Boeing* settlement followed other large settlements of derivative litigation where directors and officers (D&O) insurers made a significant contribution.[138] Practitioners started describing rising challenges for corporations seeking D&O coverage, including premium hikes and less favorable coverage terms.[139] Experts estimated that the large derivate settlements had driven up the cost of D&O insurance by 300–500 percent for most companies,[140] and that existing insurance policies, which

---

[132] *Id.,* at 44.

[133] Kevin LaCroix, *Boeing Air Crash Derivative Lawsuit Settles for $237.5 Million*, D&O DIARY (Nov. 7, 2021).

[134] For example, a search on Google News of the terms "Boeing" & "lawsuit" & "737" during the two months following the Boeing opinion yields 1,600 results, and a search of the terms "Boeing" & "Settlement" in the five months following the settlement yields 2,820 results.

[135] *Marchand v. Barnhill*, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019); *In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig.*, 2019 WL 4850188 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019); *Hughes v. Xiaoming Hu*, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 162; *Teamsters Local 443 Health Servs. & Ins. Plan v. Chou*, 2020 WL 5028065 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2020); *Inter-Mkt'ing Grp. USA v. Armstrong*, 2020 WL 756965 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2020). For analysis of this development, *see, e.g.,* Jennifer Arlen, *Evolution of Director Oversight Duties and Liability under Caremark: Using Information-Acquisition Duties in the Public Interest*, 194, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE LIABILITY (Martin Petrin & Christian Witting eds., 2023).

[136] Edward B. Micheletti, *The Risk of Overlooking Oversight: Recent Caremark Decisions from the Court of Chancery Indicate Closer Judicial Scrutiny and Potential Increased Traction for Oversight Claims,* SKADDEN (Dec. 15, 2021) https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2021/12/insights-the-delaware-edition/the-risk-of-overlooking-oversight.; *See also* Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, *Tectonic Forces To Watch In Corporate Litigation* (Jan. 23, 2020) (noting there is an expectation "to see a steady uptick in Caremark filings.") https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/ClientMemos/WLRK/WLRK.26750.20.pdf ; LaCroix, *supra* note 133 (warning that the recent Caremark decisions "had already raised alarm bells about the possible proliferation of further Caremark claims."). Additionally, a search on Nexis provides 275 media articles and court decisions that refer to *Caremark* claims between June 2019 and June 2023, compared to just 82 articles in the preceding four-year period.

[137] *See, e.g.,* Arlen, *supra note* 135, at 194 (noting that in Caremark 2.0, "Delaware imposes enhanced, and more specific, oversight duties on directors in certain circumstances"); John Armour et al., *Taking Compliance Seriously,* 37 YALE J. REG. 1, 46 (2020) (asserting that "Marchand may open the door to much deeper judicial engagement with the particulars of how boards monitor … a company's obligation to comply with law"); Roy Shapira, *A New Caremark Era: Causes and Consequences*, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 1857, 1866 (2021) (discussing "courts' increased willingness to scrutinize directors' conduct in [the Caremark] context" in the new Caremark era); Stephen M. Bainbridge, *After Boeing, Caremark is no longer "the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment"* (Sep. 8, 2021) (suggesting that "Caremark is no longer "the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.").

[138] LaCroix, *supra* note 133 (discussing the $300 million Renren settlement (October 2021), the $310 million settlement in the Alphabet/Google #MeToo derivative suit (September 2020), and the $175 million McKesson opioid derivative settlement (February 2020), and noting these settlements have significant implications for D&O coverage).

[139] Skadden, Arps, Slate, *Meagher & Flom, Delaware General Corporation Law Amended to Authorize Use of Captive Insurance for D&O Coverage* (Feb. 9, 2022), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2022/02/delaware-general-corporation-law.

[140] Lauri Floresca, *D&O Captives Have Arrived: Laser DIC Fills the Gaps*, WOODRUFF SAWYER (Mar. 6, 2023) (reporting an increase in D&O Side A coverage).

typically include carveouts for loyalty claims, might not suffice to cover directors' potential liability,[141] and that the perceived liability risk "may reduce willingness to serve as directors."[142]

In February 2022, just four months after the *Boeing* settlement, Delaware amended the DGCL to permit companies to establish subsidiaries to insure officers and directors against amounts paid in derivative claims.[143] This seemingly technical amendment overturns a fundamental principle of corporate law: a company cannot cover damages imposed on directors in a derivative lawsuit brought on the company's behalf.[144] On its face, the amendment contradicts the longstanding prohibition on indemnifying officers and directors for payments made to the company in settlement of such claims.[145]

To clarify, Section 145(g) of the DGCL explicitly permits corporations to *insure* a director or officer against losses, "whether or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify such person." However, Section 145(g) was interpreted as permitting companies to acquire insurance only from *third-party* providers,[146] and corporations were reluctant to use captive insurance as protection from *derivative* claims.[147] The amendment removed this uncertainty, responding to the concern that the apparent expansion of directors' oversight duties would increase their exposure to out-of-pocket liability.

This legislation did not overturn the *Boeing* decision, nor did it even mention directors' oversight duties. Yet, a careful examination of the amendment and its legislative history shows that its objective was to expand the protection of directors against oversight claims. Although a failure to comply with *Caremark* duties is legally treated as a violation of the duty of loyalty that is unexculpable under Section 102(b)(7), the amendment allows corporations to use captive insurance to shield

---

[141] Richards, Layton & Finger, *Amendments to the DGCL Permit Captive D&O Insurance*, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (August 4, 2023). *See also Marchand v. Barnhill*, *supra* note 135, at 824 (holding that a failure to meet directors' Caremark duties constitutes a breach of the duty of loyalty).

[142] Stephen M. Bainbridge, *Don't Compound the Caremark Mistake by Extending It to ESG Oversight*, 77 BUS. LAW. 651 (2021); Angela N. Aneiros & Karen E. Woody, *Caremark's Butterfly Effect*, 72 AM. U. L. REV. 719, 770-771 (2023) (the rise of Caremark claims could have significant implications for D&O underwriters "who are concerned about large settlements for breaches of fiduciary duty and the cost of litigation").

[143] Section 145(j) of the DGCL.

[144] Daniel E. Chefitz & Lauren Silvestri Burke, *Delaware Fully Embraces Captive Insurance as an Option to Protect Directors and Officers*, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP (Feb. 4, 2022), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2022/02/delaware-fully-embraces-captive-insurance-as-an-option-to-protect-directors-and-officers ("Indemnification by the corporation for a settlement or judgment in a derivative suit against an officer or director goes against public policy because the corporation effectively pays money damages to itself").

[145] *See* Section 145(b) of DGCL. The one exception to this prohibition was the indemnification against reasonable expenses if the director has not been adjudged liable to the corporation.

[146] When Delaware prohibited the indemnification of derivative claims in 1967, it permitted the use of D&O insurance to cover directors' liability in derivative litigation. At that time, "D&O insurance was viewed as a self-policing mechanism." *See* 1 Delaware Corp. L. & Prac. § 16.08 (2023). One could expect a third-party insurer to limit coverage or charge higher premiums for riskier companies. However, this will not be the case if the company is self-insured through captive insurance. For a discussion of the monitoring effect of insurance, *see* TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 5 (2010).

[147] Kevin LaCroix, *Delaware Legislature Passes Bill Allowing Use of Captives for D&O Insurance*, D&O DIARY (Jan. 30, 2022) https://www.dandodiary.com/2022/01/articles/d-o-insurance/delaware-legislature-passes-bill-allowing-use-of-captives-for-do-insurance/; *See also* Priya Cherian Huskins, Esq. & Evan Hessel, *D&O Game Changer: Delaware Approves Using Captives for D&O Insurance*, WOODRUFF SAWYER (Dec. 12, 2022), https://woodruffsawyer.com/do-notebook/delaware-legislature-blesses-captives-do/ ("while captive insurance is insurance, the concern is that using a parent company's captive instead of buying commercial insurance arguably looks like the corporation is attempting to fund non-indemnifiable losses since it is the corporation itself that funds the captive").

directors from liability for *Caremark* claims (as long as they did not *knowingly* cause the corporation to violate the law).[148]

The exculpation and captive insurance examples have a couple of reoccurring features. *First*, the Delaware legislature does not interfere directly with the norms promulgated by courts. Rather, it devises a new mechanism to shield insiders from out-of-pocket liability for non-conflicted decisions. For example, Delaware could have responded to *Boeing* by limiting *Caremark* claims altogether, but it did not to follow this path.[149] Delaware's strategy both preserves the courts' prominent role as the authority on fiduciary norms and lowers the political salience of these legislative interventions. Narrowing the scope of boards' fiduciary duties following high-profile cases, such as Boeing, is a politically risky move that could generate a public backlash.[150] *Second,* the amendments are tailored to address specific litigation risks. For example, officer exculpation applies only to *direct claims*, which are relevant to the specific merger litigation risk that officers faced.[151]

Indemnification. Indemnification statutes were introduced to address concerns raised by the 1939 New York case *New York Dock Co. v. McCollom*.[152] In *McCollom,* the court ruled that a corporation lacked the authority to pay the legal expenses of its directors in a derivative lawsuit, even when the directors were vindicated on the merits. Although this ruling was rejected by several courts, it caused significant alarm among executives.[153] In response, Delaware adopted Section 122(10),[154] granting corporations the power to indemnify directors or officers for expenses incurred, unless the director was "adjudged… to be liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance of duty."[155]

Ambiguity persisted regarding the application of the new provision to settlements of derivative lawsuits. A 1962 decision, *Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Dorsey Corp,*[156] urged the legislature to clarify

---

[148] Captive insurance cannot be used to pay for losses attributable to self-dealing or deliberate criminal or fraudulent acts, suggesting that the amendment was mostly aimed at addressing *Caremark* claims. *See* S. 203, 151st Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2022). These required exclusions only apply where such loss is established by a "final, non-appealable adjudication in the underlying proceeding in respect of the claim."

[149] Nevada, for example, exculpates directors and officers from any act that does not amount to a conscious violation of the law. Under Nevada's statute, directors and officers are subject to personal liability only if their breach of a duty involves "intentional misconduct, fraud or a knowing violation of law." NRS 78.138(7)(B)(2). For a detailed analysis, *see* Michal Barzuza, *Nevada v. Delaware: The New Market for Corporate Law* (ECGI Working Paper, 2024).

[150] *See* Jennifer Arlen, *Countering Capture: A Political Theory of Corporate Criminal Liability*, 47 J. CORP. LAW 862, 882-84 (2022) (showing how companies do not lobby against respondent superior as it is too politically salient. Instead, they lobby to cut the budgets of enforcement agencies, such as the SEC, IRS, because the public is less aware to these issues).

[151] A broader exculpation provision that would also cover derivative lawsuits is not required due to the demand requirements. In derivative claims, plaintiffs either must demand that the board initiate litigation or prove that such a demand would be futile (because a majority of the board is not independent or has personal interests). *See United Food & Com. Workers Union & Participating Food Indus. Empls. Tri-State Pension Fund v. Zuckerberg*, 250 A.3d 862, 876 (Del. Ch. 2020), aff'd, 262 A.3d 1034 (2021). It is challenging for plaintiffs to demonstrate that the demand is futile when the board comprises a majority of impartial directors. *See, e.g., City of Coral Springs Police Officers' Pension Plan v. Dorsey*, 2023 WL 3316246 (Del. Ch. May 9, 2023).

[152] *New York Dock Co. v. McCollom*, 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Joseph F. Johnston, Jr., *Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Directors and Officers*, 33 BUS. LAW. 1993, 1994–95 (1978).

[153] Joseph W. Bishop, Jr.*, New Cure for an Old Ailment: Insurance Against Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance*, 22 BUS. LAW. 97 (1966). In the cases following McCollom, it was held that the corporations should indemnify directors who prevail on the merits in derivative litigation, "perceiving that the indemnification was essentially part of the directors' compensation and that the real benefit to the corporation was the obtaining of their services." *See Solimine v. Hollander*, 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19 A.2d 344 (1941); *In re* E.C. Warner Co., 232 Minn. 207, 45 N.W. 2d 388 (1950).

[154] Bishop*, supra* note 153, at 98.

[155] Title 8, section 122(10) of the Delaware Code (1943).

[156] *Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Dorsey Corp.*, 40 Del. Ch. 343, 348, 182 A.2d 647, 652–53 (1962). In that case, the settlement terms did not impose any personal liability on the individual defendants.

whether it was permissible to indemnify directors' legal expenses in a derivative lawsuit settled with court approval.[157] Another question concerned a corporation's ability to purchase an insurance policy covering directors' and officers' liability.[158] This uncertainty arose from the public policy against insuring misconduct, even when the director personally pays the premium.[159] It was also argued that D&O insurance is unlawful when the statute explicitly prohibits indemnification.[160] The new corporations statute in 1967 resolved these uncertainties, striking the following compromise: insiders could be indemnified for legal expenses in derivative litigation but not for payments made pursuant to a judgment or settlement.[161] The statute also authorized corporations to purchase D&O insurance, regardless of whether indemnification was permissible.[162]

A more recent example occurred in 2008. The Court of Chancery held in *Schoon v. Troy Corp.* that the right to indemnification under a bylaw does not vest and can therefore be revoked prior to the filing of a lawsuit against directors.[163] While the decision could be well justified in light of the unique facts of this case, it received significant attention within the legal community.[164] Prominent attorneys cautioned that the ruling "may leave former directors, in particular, vulnerable to bylaw amendments affecting their right to advancement of expenses."[165] Directors were advised "to be certain that they understand the extent of their rights to indemnification and advancement of expenses and that those rights are secure."[166] In response, Delaware amended Section 145(f) to establish a default rule clarifying when indemnification and advancement rights vest. The amendment assures directors that indemnification or advancement rights cannot be revoked retroactively.[167]

---

[157] The court admitted that such indemnification might be permissible under the Delaware statute because the settlement "might not be tantamount to an "adjudication" of negligence or misconduct within the meaning of the statutory exclusion." Bishop, *supra* note 153, at 99.

[158] The ambiguity resulted from the words of section 122(10): "[s]uch indemnification shall not be deemed exclusive of any other rights to which those indemnified may be entitled, under any by-law, agreement, vote of stockholders, or otherwise." Title 8, section 122(10) of the Delaware Code (1943). Directors and their advisors argued that the non-exclusivity clause should enable the use of insurance through a contractual arrangement.

[159] Bishop, *supra* note 153, at 107.

[160] *Id.*

[161] Section 145(b); Samuel Arsht & Walter K. Stapleton, *Analysis of the New Delaware Corporation Law*, 327 (1967).

[162] Section 145(g).

[163] *Schoon v. Troy Corp.*, 948 A.2d 1157, 1165-66 (Del. Ch. 2008).

[164] Michal Barzuza, *Interlocking Board Seats and Protection for Directors after Schoon*, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 13, 2014), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/01/13/interlocking-board-seats-and-protection-for-directors-after-schoon/

[165] David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, *Corporate Governance Update: Delaware Decision Highlights Need for Director Protection* (July 24, 2008), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/delaware-decision-highlights-need-for-director-protection.pdf.

[166] *Id.* In the aftermath of *Schoon*, numerous Delaware firms adopted additional indemnification protections for their directors. Barzuza, *supra* note 164 (finding that many firms that did not already have individual indemnification contracts in place acted to adopt some form of protection, and most firms did so within eight months of the opinion).

[167] Amended Section 145(f) permits a corporation to opt out of the new default rule, i.e., to permit a certificate of incorporation or bylaw provision to allow the elimination of indemnity or advancement rights even after an act or omission occurs. However, the opt out will apply only to acts or omissions that occur after the opt out language is adopted. *See* Lewis S. Black, Jr. & Frederick H. Alexander, *Analysis of the 2009 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law*, 5 (Aug. 2009).

2. Fiduciary Duties and Private Ordering

Corporate Opportunities. The corporate opportunities doctrine is part of the duty of loyalty.[168] It prohibits fiduciaries from exploiting business opportunities that belongs to the corporation unless they first present the opportunity to the corporation and obtain authorization to pursue it.[169] Determining which opportunities "belong" to the corporation is a complex issue that has been the subject of litigation.[170]

In 2000, Delaware added new subsection 122(17),[171] granting companies the authority to renounce, in advance, their interest or expectancy in specified business opportunities.[172] Before this amendment, the DGCL did not address the permissibility of such provisions.[173] In the 1989 case *Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc.*,[174] the Chancery Court addressed a challenge to an amendment of Tri-Star's certificate of incorporation. The amendment specified when two Tri-Star's shareholders (Coca-Cola and Time) and their appointed directors could engage in the same line of business as Tri-Star or pursue corporate opportunities belonging to Tri-Star. The plaintiff contended that the amendment was invalid because it amounted to an impermissible waiver of the directors' duty of loyalty.[175] The Court agreed, holding that the amendment could be read as eliminating or limiting directors' duty of loyalty.[176]

In the dotcom era of the 1990s, corporate structures of tech firms often involved overlapping board membership and partially overlapping lines of business.[177] These structures challenged the "undivided loyalty" model of corporate opportunities,[178] and increased demand for clarity for directors by specifying, in advance, the type of opportunities that they could pursue through other entities. While at least one post-*Tri-Star* case suggested some judicial support for the use of contractual

---

168 Bainbridge, *Interest Group Analysis of Delaware Law*, *supra* note 68.

169 S*ee, e.g., Guth v. Loft*, Inc., 5 A.2d 503; *Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys.*, 673 A.2d 148.

170 Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, *Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers*, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075, 1086 (2017).

171 Delaware Bill Summary, S. 363, 140th Gen. Assembly (Del. 2000); 72 Del. Laws, c. 343, § 3 (2000).

172 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 122(17).

173 Before the enactment of 122(17), Section 102 (b)(1) provides that the certificate of incorporation may include "any provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the directors, and the stockholders…; if such provisions are not contrary to the laws of this State". Once a director breaches her duty of loyalty, Section 102(b)(7) makes it clear that a director cannot be relieved of that liability. However, that section still leaves open whether the corporation may, on incorporation, circumscribe the conduct that generates liability under the duty of loyalty.

174 *Siegman v. Tri-Star, supra* note 29.

175 *Id.*, at 23.

176 *Id.*, at 24–27.

177 Rauterberg & Talley, *supra note* 170, at 1093.

178 *Id.*

provisions to limit the scope of the doctrine,[179] considerable uncertainty persisted regarding the validity of these provisions.[180] The 2000 legislative amendment aimed to resolve this uncertainty.[181]

The amendment illustrates the need for legislation to determine the scope of issues that can be governed by private ordering. The *Tri-Star* decision underscored the difficulty of distinguishing between the permissible *ex ante* renunciation of specific opportunities and the impermissible waiver of liability for breaching the duty of loyalty. Market players were probably reluctant to adopt provisions that would challenge this ruling, and could lead to lawsuits and the imposition of personal liability on directors. The amendment clarified the scope of issues that can be subject to private ordering.

A related legislative intervention in the context of limited partnership occurred a few years later, arguably as a response to Delaware Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of an earlier version of the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act.[182] That amendment authorized the elimination of fiduciary duties of a general partner through contractual arrangements.[183]

Governance Arrangements. In 2008, the Delaware Supreme Court held in *CA, Inc. v. AFSCME* that shareholder-adopted bylaws related to director elections were generally valid under the DGCL.[184] The court also held, however, that a bylaw provision requiring the corporation to reimburse expenses incurred by a stockholder soliciting proxies in support of dissident director nominees would be invalid if it did not include a provision allowing the board to deny reimbursement if the board determined that its *fiduciary duties* required it to do so.[185]

In response to *AFSCME*, Delaware added Section 113 that authorizes bylaws requiring a corporation to reimburse proxy solicitation expenses incurred by a stockholder nominating its own directors.[186] Section 113 also identifies a nonexclusive list of conditions that the bylaws may impose on such a right to reimbursement.[187] This list, however, does not include the "fiduciary out" language required by the Delaware Supreme Court in *AFSCME*. This amendment, therefore, illustrates legislation's power to enact arrangements that overcome the constraints associated with fiduciary duties.[188]

---

[179] *U.S. WEST, Inc. v. Time Warner Inc.*, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 55 ("there is no reason why corporate charters cannot contain provisions dealing with corporate opportunities or dealing with the ability of officers or directors to compete with the corporation.") In other cases, courts narrowed the scope of corporate opportunities claims involving controlled subsidiaries. *See In re Digex S'holders Litig.*, 789 A.2d 1176 (2000); *Thorpe by Castleman v. CERBCO*, 676 A.2d 436 (1996). As Rauterberg & Talley observed, "both opinions recognized the generic and intractable challenges posed by corporate opportunities claims in cases involving ownership–board–industry overlap." *See supra* note 170, at 1094–95.

[180] Lewis S. Black, Jr. & Frederick H. Alexander, *Analysis of the 2000 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law*, 2-3 (Aug 2000).

[181] *Id.*; *See also* Rauterberg & Talley, *Supra* note 170 (noting that "the amendment specifically permits enforceable [advanced renouncements of corporate opportunities] under Delaware law, a position that—both before and after Siegman—most had considered untenable.").

[182] See Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 17-1101(b)-(d) (2005) (as amended by 74 Del. Laws, c. 265).

[183] *See Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P.* 817 A.2d 160, 167-68 (Del. 2002) (holding that a legislative amendment is required to allow a limited partnership agreement to eliminate a partner's fiduciary duties.). *See also* Myron T. Steele, *Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies*, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 11 (2007).

[184] *CA, Inc. v. AFSCME, supra* note 27.

[185] *Id.*

[186] H.B 19, 145th Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess (Del. 2009); Black & Alexander, *supra* note 167.

[187] *Id.*

[188] This amendment was initiated in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, following statements made by then SEC Chairwoman Mary Schapiro, who indicated the Commission's intention to revisit federal proxy rules. David A. Skeel, Jr. et al., *Inside-Out Corporate Governance*, 37 IOWA J. CORP. L. 147, 158–160 (2011).

In 2006, Delaware amended Section 141(b) of the DGCL to clarify that a director may tender an irrevocable resignation that is effective upon a later date or contingent on the occurrence of a future event. The amendment provides shareholders a means for implementing majority voting arrangements that seek to unseat a director who fails to receive a majority vote in an election.[189] Before the amendment, it was questionable whether a director, as a fiduciary, could irrevocably agree to resign based on future conditions (including the failure to receive a specified majority for reelection).[190] Fiduciary law had created uncertainty regarding the courts' ability to uphold the legal framework that supports majority voting policies.[191] The amendment resolved this uncertainty.

3. Bargains and Sticky Rules

Fee-shifting and Forum Selection Bylaws. Rules governing private litigation require a careful balance between discouraging frivolous lawsuits[192] and enabling legitimate claims.[193] Courts alone cannot always achieve this balance.[194] Consider *fee-shifting bylaws,* which require plaintiffs who unsuccessfully sue a company or its directors to pay the defendants' legal costs and expenses.[195] In *ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund et al.*, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a fee-shifting bylaw as facially valid.[196] Although the case involved a nonstock membership corporation, the court's reasoning was sufficiently broad to suggest that the decision also applies to public corporations. This ruling sparked debate over the permissibility of fee-shifting clauses in public corporations.[197] At least 70 public companies adopted fee-shifting provisions.[198] Delaware reacted quickly by amending Section 102 of the DGCL

---

[189] Director resignations are an essential complement to a majority voting bylaw because, pursuant to another provision of Section 141(b), even incumbent directors fail to receive the required vote under a majority voting bylaw, they would remain in office until a successor is elected. *See* Stephen J. Choi et al., *Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?*, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1122 (2016).

[190] *See Dillon v. Berg*, 326 F. Supp. 1214, 1225, (D. Del.), aff'd, 453 F.2d 1876 (3d Cir. 1971) (an undated resignation letter executed by one director and given to the CEO of the corporation was ineffective under Delaware law because it would effectively permit the CEO to remove a director).

[191] David C. McBride & Rolin P. Bissell, *Delaware's Flexible Approach to Majority Voting for Directors*, 10 WALL ST. LAW. 1 (June 2006), https://www.youngconaway.com/content/uploads/2018/06/WallStreetLawyer.pdf. The amendment was passed in the wake of the Enron-era scandals, in the face of increasing pressure from institutional investors to give stockholders more power to discipline boards of directors. In 2005, the CII and the California Public Employees Retirement System wrote nearly identical letters requesting that the DGCL be amended to provide majority voting as the default rule for the election of directors. *Id.*

[192] Minor Myers, *Do the Merits Matter: Empirical Evidence on Shareholder Suits from Options Backdating Litigation*, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 291, 298 (2016) ("The principal procedural hurdles in stockholder litigation, for both derivative and securities suits, have been shaped by the desire to inhibit meritless lawsuits.").

[193] E. Norman Veasey & Michael P. Dooley, *The Role of Corporate Litigation in the Twenty-First Century*, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 131 (2000) ("[T]he representative action is vitally important to the well-being and growth of the Delaware corporate law.").

[194] *Id.,* at 133 ("There's not much the courts can do to shape the future of litigation except in a procedural way and except to advocate reforms to streamline the process. We take the cases as they come to us.").

[195] Jessica Erickson, *The Lost Lessons of Shareholder Derivative Suits*, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1131 (2020).

[196] *ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund*, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014).

[197] *Delaware Amends its General Corporation Law to Authorize Exclusive Forum Provisions and Prohibit Fee-Shifting Provisions* 2, MAYER BROWN (June 25, 2015), https://www.mayerbrown.com/-/media/files/perspectives-events/publications/2015/06/delaware-amends-its-general-corporation-law-to-aut/files/get-the-full-report/fileattachment/150625-update-cs.pdf.

[198] *Id.*, at 2.

to prohibit the application of the *ATP's* holding to stock corporations.[199] This amendment was intended "to preserve the efficacy of the enforcement of fiduciary duties in stock corporations."[200]

At the same time, another amendment to the DGCL directly addressed private enforcement by authorizing Delaware exclusive forum provisions for internal corporate claims, while expressly prohibiting charter and bylaw provisions that exclude Delaware as a forum for such claims.[201] This amendment essentially codified the Chancery Court ruling in *Boilermakers,*[202] which upheld the validity of bylaws requiring that claims arising under the DGCL be brought exclusively in Delaware. The amendment also essentially overturned the Chancery Court decision in *First Citizens*,[203] which upheld the validity of bylaws requiring claims to be brought outside Delaware.

These concurrent legislative actions work in opposite directions. The fee-shifting amendment removes a disincentive for filing lawsuits, thereby preserving Delaware courts' ability to set norms (and serving the interests of the plaintiff bar). However, it may also negatively impact managers by increasing the likelihood of lawsuits. This is where the forum selection amendment plays a balancing role. By requiring that litigation remain in Delaware, where courts are more likely to screen frivolous lawsuits,[204] this amendment reduces such lawsuits while reinforcing the interests of the Delaware bar and the state's dominance in corporate law. A former Chancellor of the Delaware Chancery Court described these twin measures as 'a grand bargain' between Delaware's legal community and its corporate citizens.[205]

Courts are limited in their ability to strike such a bargain. Because they do not control the issues brought before them, courts are institutionally ill-equipped to create a regulatory framework that balances the interests of different groups when this requires modifying rules that involve distinct legal doctrines. From a doctrinal perspective, in the absence of express statutory language, courts interpreting the general power of the board to adopt bylaws would face challenges in holding that forum selection bylaws are valid only when they require litigation to take place in Delaware.[206]

Finally, legislation can swiftly provide certainty. Over time, the Delaware courts might have arrived at a similar outcome without legislative interventions. It has been suggested, for example, that had fee-shifting bylaws been subjected to prolonged scrutiny in Delaware courts, most of them would

---

[199] Norman M. Powell et al., *Delaware Transactional & Corporate Law Update*, 4 (Sep. 2015), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/9921-business-and-tax-section-update-sept-2019pdf.

[200] The new subsection was not intended, however, to prevent the application of such provisions under a stockholders agreement or other writing signed by the stockholder against whom the provision is to be enforced. *See* S.B 75, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess (Del. 2015).

[201] William B. Chandler III & Anthony A. Rickey, *The Trouble with Trulia: Re-Evaluating the Case for Fee-Shifting Bylaws as a Solution to the Overlitigation of Corporate Claims*, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 11, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/11/the-trouble-with-trulia-re-evaluating-the-case-for-fee-shifting-bylaws-as-a-solution-to-the-overlitigation-of-corporate-claims/

[202] In *Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corporation*, 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013).

[203] *See City of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc.,* 99 A.3d 229, 239 (Del. Ch. 2014) ("The DGCL does not express any preference of the General Assembly one way or the other on whether it is permissible for boards of directors to require stockholders to litigate intra-corporate disputes in the courts of foreign jurisdictions.").

[204] Following the *Trulia* decision, which imposed stringent standards on disclosure-only settlements in Delaware, there was concern that such lawsuits were increasingly filed elsewhere. *See* Chandler & Rickey, *supra* note 201.

[205] *Id.*

[206] *See City of Providence v. First supra* note 205, at 239 ("The DGCL does not express any preference of the General Assembly one way or the other on whether it is permissible for boards of directors to require stockholders to litigate intra-corporate disputes in the courts of foreign jurisdictions.").

not have survived.[207] Yet, this process would likely be relatively slow and involve a period of significant uncertainty, thereby failing to prevent the chilling effect of fee-shifting provisions. The legislative rule spared this lengthy decision-by-decision process, which would have imposed substantial costs on defendants, plaintiffs, and the public.[208]

Force the Vote. In 1998, the DGCL was amended to permit merger agreements to require that the merger be submitted to stockholder vote even if the board of directors determines that it is no longer advisable.[209] This amendment was enacted in response to the Delaware Supreme Court's ruling in *Van Gorkom* that the board must recommend a merger before submitting it to a stockholder vote. In the aftermath of this decision, one view was that "because directors owe fiduciary duties to stockholders, they must be able to change their minds prior to a stockholder vote and to recommend against a merger if they change their opinion as to its benefits."[210] Yet, parties to a merger might not enter into a merger agreement without the certainty that it will be submitted to a shareholder vote.[211]

Market participants likely hesitated to directly challenge the prevailing view that *Van Gorkom* prohibited the use of *force the vote* provisions. After all, why take the risk that the court would hold that a merger transaction did not meet the DGCL requirements? The amendment provided certainty without requiring transaction planners to incur the risk that their transaction would be invalidated by courts.

Appraisal. Appraisal is a statutory remedy that allows shareholders to obtain the fair value of shares they were forced to sell in mergers or acquisitions.[212] Delaware has repeatedly amended the appraisal statute,[213] often in response to court rulings.

In 1976, reacting to the prevailing judicial method of calculating interest on appraisal funds, Delaware revised the statute to give courts the power to consider "all pertinent factors," including interest rates.[214] This legislation did not provide courts with guidance on selecting the appropriate interest rate. As a result, the determination of a "fair rate" of interest became the subject of litigation that consumed significant time, frustrating the Court of Chancery, and leading it to suggest statutory rate fixing as a sensible resolution.[215] In 2005, then Vice Chancellor Strine noted that "the crafting of a specific legislative interest formula… for use in appraisal proceedings is both feasible and desirable

---

[207] Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, *Paving the Delaware Way: Legislative and Equitable Limits On Bylaws After ATP*, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 335, 377 (2015) (suggesting that "Under ATP and the Delaware Way, as properly understood and followed by courts relying upon Delaware corporate law, the only fee-shifting bylaws that will survive equitable review are those that shift reasonable fees to the other party… in cases of frivolous lawsuits or litigation tactics.").

[208] *Id.*

[209] Lewis S. Black, Jr. & Frederick H. Alexander, *Analysis of the 1998 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law*, 4 (1998).

[210] *Id.*, at 4.; *Forcing a Stockholder Vote After the Board Changes its Recommendation*, LexisNexis, https://bit.ly/3vHp1Jd ("From an acquirer's perspective, a force-the-vote provision can enhance closing certainty in a merger transaction.").

[211] *Id.*

[212] David F. Marcus & Frank Schneider, *Appraisal Litigation in Delaware: Trends in Petitions and Opinions (2006-2018)*, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 1, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/03/01/appraisal-litigation-in-delaware-trends-in-petitions-and-opinions-2006-2018/.

[213] Charles K. Korsmo & Minor Myers, *Interest in Appraisal*, 42 J.CORP. L. 109, 113 (2016).

[214] During the 1970s, Delaware's judiciary employed an approach for appraising funds that averaged yields from a diverse array of financial instruments, ranging from varying maturities of U.S. Treasury securities to commercial bank savings and from investment-grade bonds to stock market indices like the Dow Jones. This broad method prompted the legislature to revise the approach to interest calculation in such cases. *See Id.*, at 115.

[215] *Id.*, at 118–119.

for all affected constituencies."[216] In 2007, Delaware amended the appraisal statute to set a presumptive interest rate of 5 percent plus the prevailing federal funds rate.

Starting in 2011, there was a noticeable increase in appraisal-related actions.[217] Critics argued that the above-market statutory interest rate sparked a rise in appraisal lawsuits by profit-seeking investors.[218] In 2015, an amendment was proposed to permit a company to preemptively pay an amount it chooses, thereby halting the accumulation of interest on the prepaid sum.[219] This reform was ultimately passed into law in 2016,[220] and at the same time, the legislature enacted another amendment to limit appraisal rights for *de minimis* claims.[221]

The appraisal example illustrates the ongoing interaction between judicial rulings and legislation, whereby the Delaware legislature expands and restricts court discretion based on market and court feedback. Initially, the Delaware legislature expanded judicial discretion to allow for more accurate calculation of interest on appraisal funds. When this led to extensive litigation over interest rates, the legislature intervened to fix the rate by statute. When this adjustment triggered a significant rise in appraisal litigation, the legislature again stepped in. This time, legislation allowed companies to prepay an amount of their choosing to prevent the accumulation of interest and limited appraisal rights for minimal claims.[222] Without legislative amendments, courts lacked the power to adjust their treatment of appraisal claims to meet these developments.

4. The 2024 Amendments

The most recent example of amendments that aimed to conform the DGCL to market practices are two of the 2024 amendments. The *Crispo* decision addressed the question of whether a target can sue, on behalf of its shareholders, for lost premium damages resulting from the buyer's breaches.[223] In 2005, the Second Circuit ruled in *Consolidated Edison, Inc. v. Northeast Utilities* against target companies seeking such compensation.[224] For nearly two decades, Delaware's courts position on the matter was not clear and practitioners often used contractual terms to enable the target to claim such compensation on behalf of shareholders who are not parties to the merger agreement.[225] In *Crispo*, the Court of Chancery suggested that Delaware might follow the Second Circuit approach and questioned

---

[216] *Id.*, at 119 (then Vice Chancellor Strine also criticized the extensive and costly legal discussions regarding pre- and post-judgment interest rates as inefficient and discouraging. Echoing this sentiment, Chancellor Chandler observed that although the idea of a statutory interest rate is appealing, it has historically led to exhaustive and detailed legal debates over the precise rate to be applied).

[217] *Id.*, at 122.

[218] *Id.*, at 111–12. Some stockholders, it has been observed, may strategically slow litigation to leverage the statutory interest rates in appraisal cases. This behavior caught the attention of Vice Chancellor Glasscock, who pointed out the need for the issue to be reviewed by the legislative bodies in Delaware.

[219] *Id.*, at 111–112.

[220] Lewis S. Black, Jr. & A. Gilchrist Sparks, III, *Analysis of the 2007 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law* (2007).

[221] This amendment was intended to prevent stockholders from exercising their appraisal rights to gain leverage in settlement negotiations in instances where the number of shares or value of the shares in question is small, but the desire to avoid litigation costs may encourage a corporation to settle an appraisal claim. Garrett A. DeVries & Ashton Barrineau Butcher, *2016 Changes to Delaware Law Go into Effect*, AKIN (Aug 18, 2016), https://www.akingump.com/en/insights/blogs/ag-deal-diary/2016-changes-to-delaware-law-go-into-effect.

[222] *See* Korsmo & Myers, *supra* notes 213 and 217-221.

[223] *Crispo, supra* note 2.

[224] *Consolidated Edison, Inc. v. Northeast Utilities*, 426 F.3d 524 (2d Cir. 2005).

[225] *See* Morris Nichols, *Proposed Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law Would Address Recent Caselaw Regarding Stockholder Agreements and Merger Agreements* (Mar. 28, 2024), https://www.morrisnichols.com/insights-proposed-2024-amendments-delaware-general-corporation-law.

the legality of the prevailing contractual terms.[226] The amendment clarified that merger agreements may specify remedies for pre-closing breaches, including damages for lost shareholder premium.[227]

The *Moelis* decision invalidated several provisions in an agreement between a corporation and its founding shareholder. The agreement required the board to obtain the founder's consent before considering various actions, limited the board's discretion over the board's size and composition, and required the board to ensure founder representation on all committees.[228] The court held that the *combination* of these provisions was facially invalid because it infringed on the board authority under Section 141(a), which requires that the management of a Delaware corporation be directed by or under the oversight of its board.[229] The post-*Moelis* amendment provided that a corporation has the power to enter into shareholder agreements that include the consent rights and other provisions addressed in *Moelis*, even if these rights were not set forth in a certificate of incorporation.[230]

In these cases, the court acknowledged that its holdings might not align with the prevailing market practices, but explained that it was bound by the language of the statute (*Moelis*)[231] or contract law principles (*Crispo*).[232] The legislative responses purported to conform the DGCL to the existing market practices.[233] The post-*Moelis* amendment, which was published only six weeks after the court ruling, sparked unprecedented controversy.[234] While such conflicts are exceptions rather than the rule, exploring them is crucial for a comprehensive understanding of Delaware's pattern of legislative responses to court decisions. We address this issue in Part III.

***

To summarize, this Part has documented a persistent pattern of legislative responses to judicial decisions. We also presented a framework that explains the role played by legislative responses in a legal system that relies heavily on courts for setting corporate law norms and supported it with examples. Legislative responses (i) enable courts to set norms without imposing out-of-pocket liability for non-conflicted decisions on corporate insiders; (ii) balance fiduciary duties and private ordering and set tailored rules that might contradict common fiduciary principles; and (iii) adopt arrangements that require 'political' bargains across legal questions, provide certainty and address changing market practices. Figure 1 below summarizes our framework.

---

[226] *Id.*

[227] *Id.*

[228] *Moelis, supra* note 4.

[229] *Id.*

[230] *See* Nichols, *supra* note 225.

[231] *Id.*; In *Moelis*, *supra* note 4, Vice Chancellor Laster states, "What happens when the seemingly irresistible force of market practice meets the traditionally immovable object of statutory law? A court must uphold the law, so the statute prevails." *Id*, at 1. According to Laster, "Market participants must conform their conduct to legal requirements, not the other way around." *Id*, at 132.

[232] *Crispo, supra* note 2 (while the court acknowledged the efficiency of allowing a target company to seek damages on behalf of its shareholders, it asserted that such an approach is on "shaky ground" and has no legal basis).

[233] Nichols, *supra* note 225.

[234] *See, e.g.,* Sarath Sanga & Gabriel Rauterberg, *Proposed Amendments to DGCL on Stockholder Contracting Would Create More Problems Than They Purportedly Solve*, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 5, 2024), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2024/04/05/proposed-amendments-to-dgcl-on-stockholder-contracting-would-create-more-problems-than-they-purportedly-solve/ (arguing the Amendment "would replace a century of nuanced if imperfect Delaware jurisprudence with an open-ended statement that enables too much to be taken at face value"). See also the sources in *supra* note 7.

Figure 1: Framework of Legislative-Judicial Interplay in Delaware Corporate Law



Our analysis in this Part rests on the assumption that the Council, the General Assembly and Delaware courts pursue similar objectives. Indeed, much of the literature on Delaware assumes that its courts and legislature share the common goal of maintaining Delaware's position as the leading venue for incorporations.[235] The next Part re-examines this assumption.

III. Legislative Responses: Competitive Strategy and Interest Groups

We have identified a consistent pattern of legislative responses to court ruling and argued that these responses could be viewed as addressing the challenges arising from Delaware's reliance on courts for developing corporate law norms. We have also found that the frequency of legislative responses has risen in recent years.

While our findings shed new light on the forces shaping Delaware's corporate law, they also raise many novel questions for future research. In this Part, we explore some lessons of our study and identify some open questions. In Section A, we explain how the pattern of legislative responses to court rulings supports Delaware's competitive strategy. In Section B, we examine whether the history of legislative responses shows that Delaware's legislature has favored one group of stakeholders over another. We also use our study of past legislative responses to highlight the unusual process leading

---

[235] *See, e.g.,* Edward Fox, *Is There a Delaware Effect for Controlled Firms?*, 23 U. PA. BUS. L. 1, 27 (2020) ("Delaware courts appear to decide cases with an eye on keeping companies incorporating in Delaware.") But, *see also* Bainbridge, *supra* note 68, at 138–140 (arguing that "Delaware judges are concerned neither with maximizing the number of Delaware incorporations or promoting the interests of the Delaware bar" and that their use of indeterminate standards is driven by the Delaware courts' self-interest in maximizing their reputation).

to the 2024 amendments. Finally, in Section C, we show how the post-Moelis amendment presents a unique challenge to Delaware's strategy.

A. Delaware's Competitive Strategy Re-examined

We use the term "competitive strategy" to describe the method that Delaware uses to shape its corporate law in the face of competition over incorporations and the threat of federal intervention. Delaware's heavy reliance on expert judges is commonly viewed as a cornerstone of its strategy.[236] Our analysis, however, shows that Delaware relies on a combination of specialized courts and legislative responses that address the institutional limitations of its "judge-made law" model.

Some argue that expert courts employing flexible standards are better positioned than legislatures to adapt corporate norms to changing business needs,[237] and that reliance on judicial lawmaking increases political independence and enhances transparency.[238] Others argue that Delaware relies on courts and standards for strategic reasons: making it harder for other states to replicate the Delaware model or minimizing the threat of federal intervention.[239] Regardless of its advantages or the underlying motivations, a regime that entrusts courts with producing corporate norms has inevitable shortcomings, which we have described in Part II. Taking Delaware's heavy reliance on courts as given,[240] our analysis offers new insights into how Delaware overcomes these drawbacks.[241]

First, legislative amendments often *supplement* Delaware's expert courts, enhancing the quality of its corporate law. In several examples discussed in this Article, judges themselves invited legislative action or highlighted vagueness in the statute, noting their lack of authority to deviate from existing law. Moreover, a regime in which the legislature regularly responds to judicial opinions can improve the quality of judicial decisions. After all, judges can faithfully apply existing law while identifying the need for legislative amendments, knowing that the legislature may respond to the invitation to intervene. This strategy is bolstered by Delaware's distinct process for amending the DGCL, including its annual review of the need for legislative amendments.

Second, this ongoing interaction between the legislature and the judiciary reduces indeterminacy concerns. By providing clarity where court decisions may leave ambiguity, legislative responses enhance the predictability of Delaware's corporate law. Interestingly, studies on Congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions document a similar dynamic. As the authors of the studies summarized, "we were surprised at how often overrides clarified confusing rules and

---

[236] *See* Section I.A.

[237] *See e.g.,* Cross, *Book Review, supra* note 103, at 222 (arguing that the Chancery Court develops its law through judicial processes, which "allows space for the judiciary to pull back in future cases if a prior decision turns out… to have been unwise").

[238] *See e.g.,* Fisch, *supra* note 45, at 1099 (explaining how "Delaware's extensive reliance on judicial lawmaking offers several advantages over the legislative process, including greater and more balanced access to the lawmaking process, increased political independence, and enhanced decisionmaking transparency").

[239] *See, e.g.,* Kahan & Rock, *supra* note 11.

[240] For a comprehensive institutional analysis of the relative competence of legislative and judicial lawmaking, including the strengths and weaknesses of each institution, *see* NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 53-97 (1994). See also Fisch, *supra* note 45, at 1088-96.

[241] *See also* Bainbridge, *DExit Drivers, supra* note 47, at 50–60 (explaining that Delaware provides a vast repository of precedents, and Delaware judges provide guidance to attorneys outside of legal decisions).

standards created by the Supreme Court and replaced the Court's holdings with clearer legal regimes."[242]

Thus far, we have explained how the interaction between Delaware's judiciary and legislature can enhance the quality of corporate law. This interaction, however, also provides Delaware with other advantages. It provides flexibility to respond to pressures from different constituencies. For example, when managers or shareholders have a significant stake in the scope of director or officer liability, legislation can subject the matter to private ordering—leaving the final say to shareholders—without directly overturning the court's decision or its interpretation of fiduciary duties.

Legislative responses also enable Delaware to address the risk of federal intervention. For example, the *proxy access* amendment was introduced in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, following statements by then SEC Chairwoman, Mary Schapiro, who indicated the Commission's intent to revisit federal proxy rules. While courts' adherence to fiduciary duties may have limited their ability to uphold bylaws reimbursing expenses in proxy fights, legislation has greater capacity to authorize such bylaws.[243] Similarly, the extension of personal jurisdiction to officers can be viewed as Delaware's response to the corporate accountability scandals of Enron and WorldCom, which also led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and changes to Stock Exchange rules.[244]

Finally, this strategy is hard to mimic. Jurisdictions that wish to challenge Delaware's dominance, such as Nevada, Texas, or foreign jurisdictions, have formed specialized courts with expert judges. However, our analysis shows that the quality of Delaware's corporate law also depends on the interaction between its judiciary and legislature. A jurisdiction that would like to mimic Delaware's strategy will need to establish an ongoing process of reviewing judicial decisions to determine the need for a legislative response.

Our analysis above assumes that legislative responses do not lead to an open conflict between Delaware's judiciary and the legislature. Legislative responses that spark open controversy could be viewed as undermining judicial independence or signaling the Council and the General Assembly's discontent with judicial opinions. They also invite speculation about the effect of interest groups on Delaware's corporate law.[245] Somewhat surprisingly, almost all the legislative responses in our sample were not openly contentious.[246] This relatively harmonious interaction between Delaware's courts and its legislature could explain why this decades-long pattern has largely been overlooked by corporate law scholars.[247] The 2024 amendments, however, have shown that legislative responses can create tension between the judiciary and the legislature.

---

[242] Matthew Christiansen & William Eskridge Jr., *Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011*, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 1317, 1414 (2014). *See also* William Eskridge Jr., *Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions*, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991).

[243] *See supra* notes 184-188, and accompanying text.

[244] See *supra* note 115 and accompanying text; Richards, Layton & Finger, *supra* note 114 (in 2003, in the wake of a series of corporate scandals, Section 3114 was amended to add executive officers").

[245] Recall that one of the purported advantages of Delaware's reliance on judge-made law is the fact that judges are presumably less susceptible to pressure by interest groups. *See* Fisch, *supra* note 45, at 1092-95.

[246] *Cf.* Christiansen & Eskridge, *supra* note 242 at, 1414 (finding that 20% of Congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions dealt with contentious issues).

[247] *See* Section I.

B. Legislative Responses and Interest Groups

1. The Content of Legislative Reponses

We have thus far explained how legislative responses can overcome courts' institutional constraints. This view aligns with the traditional perception that the Delaware legislative and judicial branches operate in harmony.[248] Under this account, legislative responses to court rulings do not reflect disagreement or tension between Delaware's judiciary and the legislature (or the Council). However, the pattern of legislative responses that we uncovered raises the question whether this dynamic is the outcome of *different objectives* that guide Delaware's judicial and legislative branches. For example, is Delaware's legislation or its judiciary more susceptible to pressure by interest groups such as managers, controlling shareholders or lawyers?

As we explain in the next Part, this important question calls for further research, especially given our finding of the increasing frequency of legislative responses and the controversy over the 2024 Amendments. In this Section, we focus on one aspect of this broader question: Does our sample show that Delaware's legislature (more specifically, the Council) consistently favored one group over another?

Note that this question cannot be answered by assessing any specific legislative response to a judicial decision.[249] Rather, our question is whether the Delaware legislature has *consistently* responded to protect a specific group, such as managers. Answering this question requires an analysis of not only the cases in which Delaware amended the DGCL in response to a judicial decision but also the cases in which it decided *not to amend* the statute, as well as other amendments that are not related to court decisions. Furthermore, certain amendments—those that openly require "political" bargains, for example—cannot be adopted by the courts. Finally, we note the difficulty of determining whether what appears as a bias towards one group harms firm value. For instance, insulating directors and officers from liability for non-conflicted decisions could raise the concern of a legislature being captured by managers, but this pattern may also be consistent with shareholders' interest in attracting qualified candidates to the board and incentivizing them to take risks. With these limitations in mind, we offer several tentative observations based on our sample.

Perceived Beneficiaries. We first use a rough classification designed for illustrative purposes only to determine whether an amendment appears to benefit a specific group. We find that 17% of the amendments in our sample seem to benefit shareholders, 32% seem to benefit corporate insiders or controllers, and 51% do not address issues that seem to involve direct conflicts between the two groups.[250] In other words, about half of the legislative responses address issues that do not seem to involve conflicts between different corporate constituencies. These responses cannot indicate any legislative bias towards managers, shareholders, or any other stakeholder group. Instead, they may reflect the legislature's role in addressing the courts' institutional limitations.

---

[248] *See, e.g.*, Simmons, *supra* note 47, 1167–68 (2008) ("The relationship between the Delaware corporate bar, the General Assembly, the Division of Corporations, and the judiciary is best described as symbiotic. There is a significant amount of "collegial interaction" between influential groups in Delaware").

[249] As noted, careful normative analysis of each legislative intervention is beyond the scope of this Article.

[250] See Appendix A. Our analysis here is based on the direct apparent effect of the DGCL amendments. We acknowledge that an amendment that appears to restrict managers might in fact benefit them by preventing federal intervention or reducing pressure by institutional investors. Yet, such a comprehensive analysis of each legislative amendment is beyond the scope of this Article.

Insulation from Liability. We do identify a consistent pattern of providing more ways to insulate corporate insiders from out-of-pocket liability, as shown by 24% of the amendments in our sample.[251] This could be viewed as the Council and the General Assembly adopting a pro-management stance.[252] We note, however, that the most significant interventions in this category were based on private ordering: empowering shareholders to decide whether to shield insiders from liability. For example, director and officer exculpation requires shareholder approval,[253] and when these protections are put to a vote, they generally receive the support of shareholders.[254] Finally, Delaware has consistently refrained from amending the DGCL to alter the substance of directors' fiduciary duties.

Outside the context of out-of-pocket liability, it is difficult to identify a consistent pattern. For example, amendments related to proxy access and majority voting were aimed to please institutional investors, and the fee-shifting legislation could be seen as prioritizing the interests of plaintiff lawyers over those of managers (while also ensuring that litigation stays in Delaware).

Our tentative conclusion is that Delaware's pattern of legislative amendments responding to court decisions appears to resist simplistic categorization as either pro-management or pro-shareholders. We should note, however, that this does not mean that Delaware's corporate law does not favor a specific group. [255]

Delaware Lawyers. As explained in Part I, lawyers play a significant role in Delaware's legislative process.[256] Macey and Miller argue that Delaware's corporate law reflects a political equilibrium where the Delaware Bar uses its influence to secure demand for the services of Delaware lawyers by creating indeterminate legal standards that encourage litigation.[257] Indeterminate law, they argue, may be costly for both Delaware (litigation costs may deter incorporations) and shareholders (suboptimal corporate law). Nevertheless, for Delaware lawyers, indeterminate standards can generate sufficient legal work to offset any potential decline in incorporations.[258]

Our account sheds additional light on Macey and Miller's interest group theory.[259] We find that legislative interventions affect *trial* lawyers in both directions. On the one hand, several legislative amendments encourage litigation in Delaware, including the *prohibition on fee-shifting* (removing a

---

[251] One notable exception, however, is the extension of personal jurisdiction to officers by an amendment to Section 3114. *See supra* note 115.

[252] This pattern is also consistent with the view that shareholders prefer that executives are not exposed to out-of-pocket liability for actions that do not involve self-dealing.

[253] *See supra* Subsection II.C.1. See also Kahan, *The State of State Competition, supra* note 40, at 25 ("Delaware would want to provide firms with a choice of rules along the pro-management/pro-shareholder dimension.").

[254] See *supra* notes 113, 127 and accompanying text.

[255] As noted, our examination is limited to legislative responses to court decisions. We do not examine amendment to the DGCL that are not related to court decisions.

[256] *See supra* Section I.A. *See* also Eldar & Rauterberg, *supra* note 35, at 181 ("The main source of legislative drafting for any changes to Delaware's corporate law is not a political branch, but the Council of the Delaware State Bar Association's Corporation Law Section").

[257] Macey & Miller, *supra* note 60 at 472, 506 (exploring the powerful role of lawyers in Delaware and predicting that "[a]s between revenues from advisory work and litigation, the bar would certainly favor litigation, because a higher percentage of advisory work can be performed by lawyers in other states...").

[258] Bainbridge, *supra* note 68. Macey & Miller, *supra* note 60, at 504 (arguing that the bar could benefit from legal rules that increase expected legal fees per corporation, even if such rules reduced the absolute number of firms chartered in the state.).

[259] Macey & Miller, *supra* note 60. They acknowledge that "[i]f a judicial decision upsets that equilibrium, the legislature can restore the balance by enacting new statutes," but their analysis does not deeply explore how this legislative-judicial interaction influences the broader political dynamics within Delaware's corporate law framework.

disincentive for filing lawsuits),[260] and the *forum selection* amendment (ensuring litigation remains in Delaware).[261] Moreover, some legislative amendments insulating directors from out-of-pocket liability—e.g., approving the use of *captive insurance* and expanding *indemnification* rights—align with the interests of trial lawyers, who benefit from a system where courts use litigation to set new corporate law norms.[262] These legislative amendments, therefore, might support Macey and Miller's account.

On the other hand, other amendments go in the opposite direction. For example, the *exculpation* and advanced renouncements of *corporate opportunities* amendments restrict plaintiffs from bringing claims that were previously actionable.

We also find amendments that seem to be motivated by the need to uphold market practices invalided by courts, thereby responding (sometimes swiftly) to the demands of out-of-state advisors and *transactional* lawyers. The 2024 amendments illustrate this point. Two amendments (following *Crispo* and *Activision*) were allegedly justified by the need to validate customary provisions and practices in M&A agreements. Another (following *Moelis*) upheld the validity of shareholder agreements that were arguably prevalent in the market.[263] These interventions have led some to claim that they are a proof of "Delaware's willingness to be pragmatic in working with influential lawyers from out-of-state," and that the amendments were aimed at "bail[ing] out lawyers who wrote illegal agreements instead of having them deal with the consequences of their actions."[264]

Other amendments that align with the interests of transactional lawyers include the limitation on the revocation of indemnification (*Schoon*),[265] the use of corporate opportunities advanced renunciations,[266] and the amendment to Sections 204 and 205 of the DGCL, which allow corporations to ratify "defective corporate acts" that are void or voidable due to a failure of authorization.[267]

It is perhaps unsurprising that Delaware uses legislation to respond to corporate advisors' needs given the composition of the Council and our framework that explains why the legislature is better positioned than courts to provide certainty. The 2024 amendments, however, raised the concern that the Council may be too deferential to the demands of corporate advisors.

---

[260] *See supra* Section II.C.3.

[261] *Id.*

[262] *See supra* Subsection II.C.1.

[263] *See supra* Subsection II.C.3.

[264] Katie Tabeling, *House Sends Corporate Law Amendments to Governor*, DEL. BUS. TIMES (June 20, 2024), https://delawarebusinesstimes.com/news/corporate-law-amendments-govenor/. *See also* Jordan Howell, *Senate Judiciary Ignores Objections to Corporate Law Amendments*, DEL. CALL (June 12, 2024), https://delawarecall.com/2024/06/12/senate-judiciary-ignores-objections-to-corporate-law-amendments/ (quoting law professor Minor Myers saying that "many public companies have similar stockholder agreements, and lawyers behind them may be concerned about now being seen as having advised something in direct conflict with Delaware corporation laws… That to me is proof of nothing so much as the correctness of the Moelis opinion and the state's willingness to be pragmatic in working with influential lawyers from out-of-state," he said"); Michael Hanrahan, Statement Regarding the Activision Amendments, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 10, 2024), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2024/07/10/statement-regarding-the-activision-amendments/ ("Their primary purpose [of the *Activision* Amendments] appears to be protecting lawyers who fail to follow plain requirements of the DGCL.")

[265] *Supra* notes 164-166, and accompanying text.

[266] *Supra* notes 168-181, and accompanying text.

[267] In *Nguyen v. View, Inc.*, the court held that an act rejected by stockholders was not a "defective corporate act" subject to cure by ratification under Section 204. This ruling created uncertainty about which acts could be ratified under Section 204. To address this concern, the legislature amended Section 204 and clarified the definition of "defective corporate act" to include acts within the corporation's power without regard to the failure of authorization. See https://www.rlf.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/16072_Spring-2018-Cropped.pdf.

2. The Changing Dynamic of Legislative Responses

Exploring the content of a legislative response is one method for learning about the potential forces that shape the interplay between courts and legislation in Delaware. Another line of inquiry focuses on the process underlying legislative responses. Our study of six decades of legislative responses highlights noticeable changes in the dynamic underlying these interventions in recent years. This trend further invites research into the modern forces that shape Delaware's corporate law.

First, legislative interventions take place with increasing frequency. As discussed in Section II.B, we observed an average of 0.68 legislative responses per year during the past six decades. 2024 marks a departure from this historical pattern, with three amendments effectively overturning court decisions during one year.[268] The 2024 amendments occurred against a backdrop of a series of substantive legislative responses to court decisions.[269] These include the 2022 amendment authorizing captive insurance;[270] the 2022 expansion of Section 102(b)(7) to officers,[271] and the 2023 amendment authorizing charter amendments permitting stock splits without shareholder approval—a response to pending litigation in the Court of Chancery (the AMC and Coliseum Capital cases).[272]

Second, historically, there has often been a notable gap between court decisions and legislative responses. On average, legislation in our sample occurred 5.5 years after the court decision, with the median gap being 1.5 years. In contrast, the proposed 2024 amendments were announced on March 28, 2024, just *five weeks* after the *Moelis* decision.[273] Despite widespread calls to slow down the legislation, the bill was approved by the Senate and the House within less than three months.[274]

Third, critics argued that the 2024 amendments marked the first time in the General Assembly's history that a Chancery Court decision was overturned before the Delaware Supreme Court had the opportunity to review it.[275] Our analysis supports this view. We found that only *one* Chancery court decision was still pending by the time of the amendment. Moreover, even in this case, the Chancery

---

[268] The year 2003 also included three amendments, but none of them directly overturned court decisions and some of them were essentially "invited" by courts. *See* Appendix A.

[269] It could be interesting to examine the extent to which a generational shift in the composition of the Council is associated with the increased incident of substantive legislative responses to court decisions, and whether the most recent generation of the Council members are more willing to flex legislative muscle. Due to data limitation, such examination is beyond the scope of our Article.

[270] *Supra* notes 128–145 and accompanying text.

[271] *Supra* notes 125–126 and accompanying text.

[272] *In re AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc. Stockholder Litigation*, C.A. No. 2023-0215-MTZ (consol.) (Del. Ch.); *Coliseum Capital Management, LLC, et al. v. Pano Athos, et al. [Purple Innovation]*, C.A. No. 2023-0220-PAF (Del. Ch.). This amendment has been subject to criticism. Some view it as a significant departure from Delaware's traditional approach to shareholder protection. *See* The Chancery Daily, The Long Form - Special Edition (Apr. 8, 2024). *See* Usha Rodrigues, *The Hidden Logic of Shareholder Democracy*, (Working Paper, 2024) (describing this amendment as a "destabilization of the shareholder veto vote").

[273] The *Moelis* decision was given on February 23, 2024. *Supra* note 4.

[274] *See* Jordan Howell, *Sparks fly in final hearing on corporate law amendments*, DEL. CALL (June 22, 2024), https://delawarecall.com/2024/06/22/sparks-fly-in-final-hearing-on-corporate-law-amendments/.

[275] At the time the amendments were proposed, "[t]he Moelis case had not even reached summary judgment in the Court of Chancery and was still months away from a likely appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court." Howell, *Id.*

Court did not make a definitive ruling on the issue at hand, making it incomparable to the 2024 intervention.[276]

Fourth, the three amendments in 2024 effectively overturned court decisions and, unlike virtually all prior amendments, they encountered fierce opposition at different stages of the legislative process.[277] In the Executive Committee of the DSBA, two members voted against the amendments and three abstained.[278] The bill narrowly passed the House Judiciary Committee, with six votes in favor, four votes against, and one member absent.[279] In the final vote in the House, the amendments passed with 34 votes in favor and seven votes against.[280]

It is instructive to compare the 2024 legislative process with the dynamic that followed the *Van Gorkom* decision. In a retrospective interview, E. Norman Veasey, who served as President of the DSBA and later Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, emphasized that the final wording of Section 102(b)(7) was the product of extensive negotiations between attorneys representing plaintiffs and corporations. Veasey credited Joe Rosenthal, a plaintiffs' lawyer, with advocating for exceptions to the exculpation provision and the requirement for shareholder approval.[281] Despite plaintiffs' lawyers being a minority on the Council, it was crucial for all parties to achieve consensus. By contrast, the 2024 amendments lacked a similar consensus building process.[282]

Finally, the 2024 amendments also challenged the long-held assumption about the harmonious relationship between Delaware's legislative and judicial branches. As Rep. John Kolwalko stated: "[t]his particular bill intends to blur the Constitutional line of separation of powers by having the state legislature pass a law that can hamstring the judiciary, even as active cases are being judged."[283] In an open letter to the DSBA Executive Committee, Chancellor McCormick criticized the 2024 amendments, contending that they are "a drastic departure from Delaware's respected traditions."[284] Critics voiced concerns that "such a major change in response to a group of transactional lawyers

---

[276] In *Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger International, Inc.* (2004), the Court of Chancery questioned the literal interpretation of Section 271 of the DGCL, but declined to rule on the issue. In response, the legislature amended that Section in 2005. This is case where the amendment clarified an issue that the court had identified but chose not to rule on. Frederick H. Alexander, Esq. & Jeffrey R. Wolters, Esq., Analysis of the 2002 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law, 5 (Aug. 2005), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/6784-analysis-2005-amend-del-gen-corp-lawpdf.

[277] *See supra* notes 85-86.

[278] The Chancery Daily, *Responses to the Proposed Amendments to the DGCL*, LINKEDIN (May 22, 2024), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/responses-proposed-amendments-dgcl-the-chancery-daily-lzfgc/.

[279] Howell, *Senate Judiciary Ignores Objections, supra* note 264 ("[T]he Judiciary Committee… has seven members but only four who voted in favor of the legislation").

[280] Howell, *supra* note 274 Jeff Montgomery, *Delaware's Corporate Law Debate Left 'Blood On The Floor'*, LAW360 (June 21, 2024), https://www.law360.com/articles/1850449.

[281] Case: The Evolution and Adopting of Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (Taping Date: June 20th, 2017), https://archive.law.upenn.edu/live/files/7874-102b-7veasey-mcnally-correcteddocx (describing how they negotiated 102(b) with Joe Rosenthal).

[282] *See supra* note 8.

[283] Jordan Howell, *Dissent in House Judiciary over controversial corporate amendments*, DEL. CALL (June 19, 2024), https://delawarecall.com/2024/06/19/dissent-in-house-judiciary-over-controversial-corporate-amendments/

[284] Letter from Kathaleen St. Jude McCormick, Chancellor, Del. Ct. of Chancery, to The Del. State Bar Ass'n Exec. Comm. 5 (Apr. 12, 2024), https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/24692528/mccormick-ltr-to-dsba.pdf.

frustrated by a recent Court of Chancery opinion threatens Delaware's legitimacy",[285] and that passing the law would send a message that "Delaware courts don't matter."[286]

To summarize, although Delaware has consistently used legislative amendments to respond to court decisions, these legislative responses rarely sparked controversy. However, the dynamic between Delaware's legislature and its judiciary has recently changed, especially in the aftermath of the *Moelis* decision.[287] Time will tell whether the open controversy surrounding the 2024 amendments represents an anomaly or the culmination of increasing tensions between Delaware courts and the Council.

C. The Market Practice Challenge

Critics of the post-*Moelis* amendment argue that it undermines Delaware's foundational principle of board-centric governance,[288] erodes investor protection,[289] and grants disproportionate power to dominant shareholders.[290] Conversely, supporters describe the amendment as an issue of 'form over substance',[291] asserting that it allows corporations to include in shareholder agreements the same types of governance arrangements that could be included in a company's charter or its preferred stock.[292]

We do not take a stand on the substance of the *Moelis* amendment. Rather, we argue that it exemplifies another challenge associated with Delaware's heavy reliance on courts, namely the use of *ex-post* adjudication to determine the validity of governance innovations. Delaware courts are tasked with determining whether companies' governance arrangements are lawful. Courts, however, must wait for plaintiffs to challenge these arrangements through litigation. When a lawsuit is filed after a governance innovation has become prevalent, a decision invalidating this innovation could leave the companies that adopted it without the ability to adjust. In other words, a legal system based on *ex-post*

---

[285] Kahan & Rock, P*roposed DGCL § 122(18), supra* note 7. See also The CII letter, *supra* note 6 (Delaware "reputation could be seriously impaired by a perception that influential actors can easily change the law whenever the Delaware Court of Chancery has the temerity to rule against them.").

[286] Howell, *supra* note 283 (quoting Dael Norwood).

[287] *See, e.g.*, Jordan Howell, *Top Delaware judge calls for more debate over contentious corporate amendments*, DEL. CALL (May 29, 2024), https://delawarecall.com/2024/05/29/top-delaware-judge-calls-for-more-debate-over-contentious-corporate-amendments/ (quoting professor Lawrence Hamermesh, who said: "you'd have to go back to 1988—the age of hostile takeovers—to find a legislative process that was more contentious.").

[288] *See, e.g.,* Kahan & Rock, supra note 7; Robert B. Thompson letter to the DSBA Executive Committee (April 11, 2024), https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/24678984/letter-to-delaware-bar-april-112024.pdf

[289] *See, e.g.,* Bebchuk, *The Perils of Governance by Stockholder Agreements*, supra note 7; Howell, *supra* note 283 ("critics contend the amendments will give companies *carte blanche* to enter into secret side deals with powerful investors … but without needing approval from shareholders").

[290] *See,* Sanga & Rauterberg, *supra* note 234 (arguing that the Amendment "would replace a century of nuanced if imperfect Delaware jurisprudence with an open-ended statement that enables too much to be taken at face value"); Ann Lipton, *What is the value of the corporate form?*, BUS. L. PROF BLOG (Mar. 29, 2024), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2024/03/what-is-the-value-of-the-corporate-form.html (claiming that the proposed amendment "does not seem to place any limits on the kinds of rights that can be given to stockholders directly in the first place.)"

[291] Chancery Daily newsletter, The Long Form - July 18, 2024, *supra* note 6.

[292] A revision to the original proposal clarified that shareholder agreements could only establish corporate structures that are already permissible under the corporate charter and Delaware law. *See* Jordan Howell, *Controversy Swirls Around Proposed Changes to Delaware's Corporate Code*, DEL. CALL (May 24, 2024). See also Lawrence Hamermesh, *Letter in support of the proposed amendments to §122 DGCL*, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jun. 11, 2024), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2024/06/11/letter-in-support-of-the-proposed-amendments-to-%C2%A7-122-dgcl/; Moreover, most public companies have blank-check preferred shares in their charter, the terms of which may be expressly determined by the board. Therefore, certain rights conferred by shareholder agreements can also be put in a preferred stock, without shareholder approval.

adjudication faces dual concerns: (1) the emergence and persistence of legally questionable market practices; and (2) the high costs associated with invalidating such practices much later.

To illustrate this challenge, consider the following scenario: At T_0, a company adopts a novel governance arrangement. Although neither the DGCL nor case law expressly addresses the validity of this arrangement, the company's legal advisors believe it to be valid. At T_1, a lawsuit is filed, and the court holds that the governance innovation is unlawful. If the time gap between T_0 and T_1 is small, the court's ruling is unlikely to create a problem for other companies.

Courts, however, depend on plaintiffs to bring cases. Assume the governance arrangement is left unchallenged for several years. With time, more companies decide to follow suit, and a new market practice emerges. Only then a lawsuit challenging the new governance arrangement is filed. When the gap between T_0 and T_1 is large and a market practice emerges, the court's invalidation of the governance innovation will significantly affect many companies that will need to redesign their existing governance structure (including the need to secure the consent of different stakeholders). The ruling can also create widespread uncertainty about the validity of similar practices and corporate governance norms.

In the *Moelis* case, the stockholder agreement at issue was executed in 2014, with the lawsuit filed nearly a decade later.[293] Critics argued that the *Moelis* ruling threatened the legality of potentially thousands of existing contracts that "have been the basis for long-standing investments in both public and private companies."[294] They also claimed that it potentially invalidates common provisions in settlement agreements between companies and activist investors.[295]

Relying on courts to determine the validity of governance innovations that have become prevalent creates a challenge for Delaware. On the one hand, courts should invalidate unlawful governance norms, and they should do so even when a governance innovation has become widespread. Indeed, both Vice Chancellor Laster in the *Moelis* opinion and legal scholars have pointed out the significant difficulty in validating unlawful actions solely because they have become common after they were unchallenged for a long time.[296] If they avoid invalidating governance arrangements only because of the costs for other companies, courts will *de facto* empower lawyers advising corporations to shape corporate law. This might adversely affect their *ex-ante* incentives and the level of caution they exercise when advising clients.

On the other hand, courts have limited capacity to address the market-wide implications when the governance norm underlying their decision has turned into a market practice. One could argue that the legal system should not be concerned with firms that had adopted governance arrangements that were later found to be unlawful. From this perspective, entrepreneurs and companies should avoid adopting questionable governance arrangements in the first place. This strict approach, however, could hinder innovation and inhibit the development of new, beneficial corporate practices. Moreover,

---

[293] *Moelis, supra* note 4, at 17.

[294] See Hamermesh, *supra* note 292; Macey, *supra* note 5, at 7-8. *The Long Form - June 12, 2024*, CHANCERY DAILY (June 12, 2024), https://mailchi.mp/chancerydaily.com/2024-06-12-long-form-fwklnknjgytftfytfygu; *See also The Long Form - July 18, 2024*,, *supra* note 6 (the Chair of the Council emphasized that "there's lots of agreements already out there that are of questionable, validity, or arguably, potentially invalid"). Since many of these agreements were adopted by private companies and are not publicly disclosed, it is impossible to estimate their accurate number.

[295] Critics also claimed that it potentially invalidates common provisions in settlement agreements between companies and activist investors. Innisfree M&A, *2024 Proxy Season Trends: Mid-Season Review*, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 15, 2024), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2024/06/15/2024-proxy-season-trends-mid-season-review/

[296] *Supra* note 231; Bebchuk, *supra* note 7.

the more prevalent the practice becomes and the longer it goes unchallenged after becoming widespread—the stronger the market's reliance on it, and the costs of invalidation increase.

To summarize, while respecting established market practices can promote business certainty and innovation, it also risks granting too much power to lawyers. In the next Part, we analyze several paths to address this complexity.

IV. Going Forward

In this Part, we consider the implications of our study and discuss important questions that it raises for further research. We first explain how Delaware can design legislative responses to address the market practice challenge. We then explore the lessons of our study for institutional investors and review directions for future research.

A. Legislative Responses to the Market Practice Challenge

Grandfathering Amendments. Recall that the market practice challenge arises when courts find that a governance innovation adopted by a significant fraction of the market is unlawful. Institutional constraints limit the court's ability to address this challenge. If it finds a governance norm is unlawful, the court cannot provide all the companies that adopted the norm the opportunity to adjust by declaring, for example, that its ruling will become effective only at some future time. Differently put, courts generally cannot grandfather unlawful governance arrangements (even if they have become common in the marketplace).[297] Legislation, in contrast, can adopt grandfathering or similar arrangements. Based on that understanding, Kahan and Rock put forward a compromise proposal in the context of the *Moelis* amendment, which included a three- or five-year safe harbor from the application of the *Moelis* ruling to existing shareholder agreements.[298]

We propose that Delaware use legislative amendments of this type to address the market practice challenge. This approach offers several advantages: it provides companies with time to conform their governance arrangements to the court's ruling. At the same time, it preserves the role of the courts as independent arbiters of the legality of new governance practices (and not grant too much power to lawyers advising companies). Finally, the delayed application of the court's decision would allow for a longer legislative process concerning the need for additional legislative amendments.[299]

Ex-ante guidance and pre-ruling. In theory, another potential solution is to establish a mechanism to provide official guidance upfront, rather than relying solely on *ex-post* judicial review. For example, the SEC "No-Action Letter" process allows companies to submit detailed descriptions of proposed activities and receive assurance that the SEC would not recommend enforcement action against

---

[297] To address this challenge, courts sometime provide guidance to market players on preferred market practices through *dicta*. *See* Savitt, *supra* notes 47. However, the use of this tool is subject to court discretion and may not be appropriate in all situations.

[298] Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, *Section 122(18) DGCL: A proposed compromise*, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 10, 2024).

[299] A grandfathering amendment will reduce the costs of invalidating established market practices. One might argue, however, that it would not eliminate the problem of defeated reasonable expectations and irretrievable sunk costs. A more comprehensive grandfathering approach would permanently validate existing arrangements and leave the market-changing ruling in place prospectively only. This approach, however, might undermine advisors' incentive to ensure that new governance innovation comply with legal requirements.

them.[300] These letters are also published on the SEC's website, offering guidance to other companies facing similar issues.[301] Providing lawyers with guidance from the outset reduces instances where they assume certain practices are legal, only for courts to later rule otherwise. Importing such a mechanism to Delaware, however, requires substantial structural changes in its existing model, and it is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future.

Another *ex-ante* mechanism is expanding the legislature's role to address legal issues that have traditionally been left to *ex-post* judicial interpretation. Greater reliance on precise statutory rules will also reduce the likelihood of institutional clashes between the judiciary and the legislature. A rule-based strategy, however, also shifts power away from judges by limiting judicial discretion and oversight, and thus risks undermining existing shareholder protection. It could also undermine Delaware's traditional competitive advantage, which heavily relies on expert judges to set norms and has already formulated a robust body of precedents. For these reasons, a significant deviation from the classic common law style of corporate lawmaking and a greater shift towards a rule-based approach seems unlikely.

B. Lessons for Institutional Investors

The large asset managers—and especially the Big Three—collectively hold a large fraction of the shares in U.S. capital market and exert significant influence over public companies.[302] These investors presumably have an interest in ensuring that legislative changes do not reduce the value of Delaware corporations, which constitute a significant fraction of the companies in their portfolios.[303]

Large asset managers occasionally express their views on regulatory reforms that might affect them as investors in public companies.[304] However, despite their substantial stakes, these asset managers have largely remained silent on Delaware's corporate legislation, including the controversial 2024 amendments. The only exception is two letters that the Council of Institutional Investors (CII) sent to the DSBA and Governor requesting, unsuccessfully, that DSBA pause the legislative process and that the Governor veto S.B. 313. [305] None of the giant index funds, however, expressed their view on this pressing issue.

This Article has shown that, contrary to the prevailing view, legislative amendments in response to court decisions play an important role in shaping Delaware's corporate law. It is therefore essential for these investors to follow proposed corporate legislation in Delaware, assess its likely effect on their rights as investors and the value of their portfolio, and express their views when the need arises. While it remains to be seen whether greater shareholder involvement would change the balance of powers that shape Delaware's corporate legislation, it would at least inform the debate over controversial amendments.[306]

---

[300] *No Action Letters*, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/no-action-letters (last visited July 27, 2024).

[301] *Id.* ("[T]he SEC staff may permit parties other than the requestor to rely on the no-action relief to the extent that the third party's facts and circumstances are substantially similar to those described in the underlying request.").

[302] *See, e.g.,* Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, *The Specter of the Giant Three*, 99 B.U. L. REV. 721, 725-26 (2019); Edward B. Rock, *Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance*, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 363, 365 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018).

[303] For the leading role of Delaware in attracting incorporations, *see supra* note 37.

[304] *See, e.g.,* Blackrock's comment letter on the SEC's proposed rule on climate risk disclosure: *The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors (File Number S7-10-22)*, BLACKROCK (June 17, 2022) https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/sec-enhancement-and-standardization-of-climate-related-disclosures-for-investors-061722.pdf

[305] *See supra* note 6.

[306] For notable examples, *see supra* note 51.

C. Future Research

Our findings raise important questions for researchers of corporate law. In the previous Part we tried to provide tentative answers, based on our limited sample, to some of these questions. In this Section, we review directions for future research that go beyond the scope of our current study of past legislative responses.

Our analysis suggests that legislation plays a more important role than previously recognized in Delaware's corporate law. This insight calls for more research on Delaware's unique process for amending the DCGL. For example, will more transparency concerning the Council's deliberations improve this process or undermine Delaware's effort to 'professionalize' its corporate law? Our study also invites research into legislative amendments that *did not* respond to court decisions. What is the motivation for these amendments? Are these amendments aligned with the patterns we observed in responsive legislation or differ in their objectives or motivation?

Moreover, our study of the interplay between Delaware's legislation and its judiciary has focused only on legislative responses to court decisions. A fuller account requires research into how *courts* have responded to past legislative amendments. Additionally, our methodology can also be used to analyze legislative responses to court decisions concerning partnerships, LLCs and other business entities. This broader inquiry may shed more light on the forces that drive legislative responses and uncover potential differences in legislative intervention patterns and objectives across various legal entities with different stakeholders.

Finally, our finding that legislative responses seem to occur with increasing frequency, with the 2024 amendments being exceptionally controversial, calls for research into the forces that currently shape Delaware corporate law, and whether different interests or actors affect Delaware's corporate legislation and its courts.

Outside corporate law, it would be interesting to explore legislative responsiveness to court decisions in other legal contexts, such as contracts, torts, or securities regulation, and compare them to the legislature's involvement in Delaware corporate law. How frequent are legislative interventions in these other areas? What triggers them? Is there a difference between interventions at the Federal level versus state level?

Conclusion

The Delaware model inspired policymakers in the U.S. and around the world. But, what does it take to be like Delaware?

This Article proposes a framework that explains why ongoing legislative responses to court decisions play an important role in Delaware, a jurisdiction that relies on courts for setting corporate law norms. It documents a persistent pattern over the past decades of legislative responses to judicial decisions that aim at (i) enabling courts to set norms without imposing out-of-pocket liability for non-conflicted decisions on corporate insiders; (ii) balancing fiduciary duties and private ordering and providing tailored rules that might be in tension with universal fiduciary standards; and (iii) devising arrangements that require 'political' bargains across legal questions, providing certainty, fixing errors and addressing changing market practices. When employed properly, we show how these legislative interventions *complement* courts, often alleviating external pressures when a judicial ruling creates shocks or uncertainties in the market.

However, the 2024 amendments present a cautionary tale and underscore the risks underlying this strategy. These amendments suggest that legislative responses might reflect disagreements between the Council, the Delaware's legislature and its judiciary and jeopardize the stability of the Delaware model. The 2024 amendments thus call for more informed analysis of Delaware's legislative-judiciary interplay. Our Article is a first step in that direction.

Time will tell whether the open controversy around 2024 amendments will be an outlier or turning point making future legislative responses to court decisions more contentious. If this trend persists, how will judges and shareholders react in the future? Will courts find ways to challenge legislative responses that significantly limit their decisions? Will large institutional investors, who have remained on the sidelines so far, try to influence Delaware's corporate legislation?

Finally, the 2024 amendments involved rare disagreements within the General Assembly and prompted some stakeholders to urge Delaware politicians to engage more actively and vet these amendments. For example, the CII letter to the Governor urged him (unsuccessfully) to veto S.B. 313, arguing that the bill could impair Delaware's reputation for careful and deliberate adoption of corporate law.[307] Will this lead the General Assembly to take a more active role in future cases of corporate legislation? Moreover, would the prospect of such oversight improve the quality of legislative amendments (for example, by incentivizing members of the Council to seek broad consensus on contentious issues) or undermine the 'professional' nature of Delaware's corporate legislative process?

It remains to be seen whether the debate surrounding the 2024 amendments is an unusual occurrence or a pivotal moment marking the emergence of differing opinions within Delaware regarding the vision for its corporate law. If contentious legislative interference in court decisions becomes the new norm, researchers will need to further study the various interests and ideologies that may motivate the members of the Council, as well as the need for structural reforms in Delaware's traditional lawmaking process.

[307] *See supra* note 6.

Appendix A: List of Legislative Interventions

[See Attachment]

	Year	DGCL §	Amendment Description[1]	Amendment Type	Time Gap: Ruling to Amendment[2]	Directly Benefiting directors/officers or shareholders?[3]
1.	1967	§144	**Interested directors & officers' transactions.** Amended Section 144 specifies conditions under which transactions involving interested directors or officers would not be void or voidable. Among others, it provides three situations in which the participation of an interested director/officer in authorizing a challenged transaction does not *per se* make that transaction void or voidable.	**Reverses case law**.[4] In a line of cases prior to this amendment, e.g., *Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp.*,[5] *Martin Foundation, Inc. v. North American Rayon Corp*,[6] and *Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways*,[7] Delaware courts upheld the common law rule that the vote of an interested director will not be counted in determining whether the challenged action received the affirmative vote of a majority of the board.[8]	19 years	Directors & Officers
2.	1967	§145	**Indemnification of officers, directors.** New Section 145 provides that officers and directors could be indemnified for *legal expenses* in derivative litigation but not for any payments made pursuant to a judgment or settlement. The statute also authorizes corporations to advance litigation expenses and to purchase D&O insurance, regardless of whether indemnification in a particular situation is permissible.	**Clarifies case law**.[9] In a 1962 decision, *Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Dorsey Corp*, the Chancellor called on the legislature to clarify whether it is proper to indemnify directors' legal expenses in a derivative lawsuit that is settled with court approval.[10]	5 years	Directors & Officers
3.	1967	§202	**Restrictions on stock transfer**. The amendment validated four types of stock transfer restrictions, without making the list exclusive, whether imposed in	**Clarifies case law**. Prior case law cast doubt on the validity of an agreement that a stockholder could not transfer their stocks without the consent of the	37 years	

			charter, by-laws, or stockholder's agreement.	corporation or their fellow stockholders (*Greene v. E. H. Rollins & Sons, Inc.*)[11] and suggested that a right of first refusal in the corporation might be invalid unless related to the purposes of the corporation (*Lawson v. Household Finance Corporation).*[12]		
4.	1969	§141(h) (Chapters 150, 148 & 149 of Vol. 57 Laws of Delaware)	**Authority to set director remuneration**. The amendment granted the board the authority to set compensation for its members unless limited by the certificate of incorporation or by-laws.[13]	**Clarifies the law**. The amendment rejects an earlier suggestion made in obiter dictum that directors lacked the power to vote on board member compensation without specific authorization from stockholders or	Information is not available	Directors

[1] When two (or more) related amendments are conduted in the same year, we counted them as a single amendment to avoid double counting.
[2] For periods of several years, only full years are counted. For periods around 1-2 years, both years and months are included.
[3] We use the term "perceived beneficiaries" as careful normative analysis of each legislative intervention is beyond the scope of this Article. We left blank any amendment that is procedural or that does not seem to involve direct conflicts between different constituencies, such as managers and shareholders.
4 S. Samuel Arsht & Walter K. Stapleton, Analysis *of the 1967 Amendments to the Delaware Corporation Law,* Prentice-Hall, Inc. – Corporation Report, 311, 327 (1967), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/6904-analysis-1967-delaware-corporate-law-amendments. Samuel Arsht & Walter K. Stapleton, *Delaware's New General Corporation Law: Substantive Changes*, 23 BUS. LAW. 75, 81 (1967).
[5] *Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp.*, 64 A.2d 581 (Del. 1948).
[6] *Martin Foundation, Inc. v. North American Rayon Corp.*, 31 Del. Ch. 195. (August 29, 1949).
[7] *Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways*, 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d 652 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
[8] Blake Rohbacher, John Mark Zeberkiewicz & Thomas A. Uebler, *Finding Safe Harbor: Clarifying the Limited Application of Section 144*, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 722-23 (2008).
9 S. Samuel Arsht & Walter K. Stapleton, Analysis *of the 1967 Amendments to the Delaware Corporation Law,* Prentice-Hall, Inc. – Corporation Report, 311, 327 (1967), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/6904-analysis-1967-delaware-corporate-law-amendments. Samuel Arsht & Walter K. Stapleton, *Delaware's New General Corporation Law: Substantive Changes*, 23 BUS. LAW. 75, 81 (1967).
[10] Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Dorsey Corp., 40 Del. Ch. 343, 348, 182 A.2d 647, 652–53 (1962)..
[11] Arsht & Stapleton, *Analysis of the 1967 Amendments to the Delaware Corporation Law*, *Supra* note 4, at 333. *Greene v. E. H. Rollins & Sons, Inc.*, 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A. 2d 249 (Ch. 1938).
[12] *Lawson v. Household Finance Corporation* 17 Del. Ch. 343, 152 Atl. 723 (Sup. Ct. 1930); *Delaware's New General Corporation Law: Substantive Changes, Supra* note 4, at 82.
[13] S. Samuel Arsht & Walter K. Stapleton, *Analysis of the 1969 Amendments to the Delaware Corporation Law,* Prentice-Hall, Inc. – Corporation Report, 347, 350 (1969), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/6906-analysis-1969-delaware-corp-law-amendments.

				provisions in the charter or by-laws.		
5.	1982 and 1983.[14]	§202(a) (H.B. 185, Gen. Assemb. 132nd, Reg. Sess. (Del. 1983))	**Restrictions on transfer and ownership of securities**. The term "security" in Section 202 previously referred to both the underlying ownership interest and the certificate representing ownership. The amendment inserted the words "certificate representing the" before "security" where it clearly refers to the document of ownership, not the ownership right itself.[15]	**Aligns statute with case law**. The amendment codifies the holding in *Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Conoco, Inc.*[16]	1 year, 9 months	
6.	1986	§102(b)(7) (S.B. 533, Gen. Assemb. 133rd, Reg. Sess. (Del. 1986))	**Out-of-pocket liability protections (director exculpation).** The amendment allowes companies to adopt charter provisions that exempt directors from monetary liability for breaches of duty of care.[17]	**Addresses the consequences of the court decision without directly challenging it**. The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in *Smith v. Van Gorkom*, Del. Supr., 488 A.2d 858 (1985) held directors liable for failing to conduct an adequate sale process. This ruling raised concerns about director liability.[18]	1 year, 4 months	Directors

[14] Additionally, §§255(a),(b),(f) were amended to protect against the argument that the mere power to merge with a non-charitable corporation causes a charitable corporation to lose its exempt status under federal tax law asserted by the Internal Revenue Service in *Stevens Bros. Foundation, Inc. v. Commissioner*, 324 F.2d 633, 642-46 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 969 (1964). *See infra* note 16 at 20.

[15] H.B. 185, Gen. Assemb. 132nd, Reg. Sess. (Del. 1983) at 19, https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/6835-132-83-84-hb-130-249pdf.

[16] *Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Conoco, Inc.* 519 F. Supp. 506 (D. Del. 1981); *Amendments by the Second Regular Session of the 131st and the First Regular Session of the 132nd General Assemblies of the State of Delaware*, The Corp. Trust Co. (1983) at 13, https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/6766-1982-and-1983-delaware-corp-law-amendmentspdf.

[17] S.B. 533, Gen. Assemb. 133rd, Reg. Sess. (Del. 1986) at 1-2 ("Section 102(b)(7) and the amendments to Section 145 represent a legislative response to recent changes in the market for directors' liability insurance."), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/7665-1986sb333pdf.

[18] Lewis S. Black, Jr. & A. Gilchrist Sparks, III, *Analysis of the 1986 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law*, 311, 312 (July 1986), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/6618-1986-dgcl-article.

	1986	§145 (S.B. 533, Gen. Assemb. 133rd, Reg. Sess. (Del. 1986))	**Out-of-pocket liability protections (director indemnification).** Before the new amendments, Section 145(b) required court approval of indemnification for expenses incurred in derivative actions where that person seeking indemnification had been found liable "for negligence or misconduct in the performance of his duty". The amendment removed this language.	**Aligns statute with case law**. The amendment aligned the statute with Delaware Supreme Court decisions in *Smith v. Van Gorkom* (1985) and *Aronson v. Lewis* (1984), in the sense that directors are liable only for gross negligence in duty of care violations.[19] (The amendment did not change the requirement of court approval in cases resulting in liability adjudication).	1 year, 4 months	
7.	1987	§213(a)-(b) (S.B. 93, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 1987))	**Action by written consent**. The amendment clarified procedures for fixing record dates for action by written consent.[20]	**Clarifies the law**. The amendment followed the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in *Empire of Carolina, Inc. v. Deltona Corp.*,[21] which highlighted ambiguities in the consent action process and invited clarification by the legislature.[22]	1 year, 9 months	
	1987	§228 (S.B. 93, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 1987))	**Action by written consent**. New subsection (c) mandates that each written consent bear the date of the stockholder's signature and that no consent would be effective unless delivered to the corporation within 60 days of the earliest dated consent.[23]	**Clarifies the law**. The Pabst Brewing Co. v. Jacobs, 549 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Del. 1982), aff'd, 707 F.2d 1394 (3d Cir. 1982) case ruled that consents were valid for 60 days from the record date, addressing concerns about indefinite consent solicitations. The	5 years	

[19] *Smith v. Van Gorkom*, Del. Supr., 488 A.2d 858 (1985); *Aronson v. Lewis*, Del. Supr., 473 A2d 805 (1984). Black & A Sparks, *Analysis of the 1986 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law*, *Supra* note 18 at 312.

[20] S.B. 93, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 1987) at 3, 15-16, https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/6838-134-87-88-sb-1-125pdf.

[21] *Empire of Carolina, Inc. v. Deltona Corp.*, 514 A.2d 1091 (Del. 1985).

[22] Lewis S. Black, Jr. & A. Gilchrist Sparks, III, *Analysis of the 1987 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law*, 311, 313 (1987), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/6771-analysis-1987-amend-del-gen-corp-lawpdf.

[23] *Supra* 20 note at 5, 16-17.

				amendment requires all consents to be delivered within 60 days of the earliest date of consent. This change shifts the start of the 60-day period from the record date to the first consent date.[24]		
8.	1987	§268(a) (S.B. 93, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 1987))	**Appraisal rights** Section 262(a) was amended to clarify when a stockholder must be a stockholder to qualify for appraisal rights.[25]	**Clarifies the law**. This change addresses an issue raised, but not decided, in *AC Acquisition Corp. v. Anderson Clayton & Co.*[26] In that case it was argued that under the old law, a stockholder needed to be a "stockholder of record" on the date when the list of shareholders eligible to vote on a merger was finalized. The amendment rejects this interpretation. Instead, it stipulates that stockholders must be on record when making the *appraisal demand*, and hold shares continuously from demand to merger completion.[27]	9 months	

[24] *Supra* note 22 at 314.
[25] *Id.* at 18.
[26] *AC Acquisition Corp. v. Anderson Clayton & Co.*, C.A. No. 8501 (Del. Ch. June 10, 1986).
[27] *Supra* note 22 at 316.

	1987	§268 (i) (S.B. 93, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 1987))	**Appraisal rights** The amendment permits courts to award either simple or compound interest on an appraisal award, measured from the date of the merger.[28]	**Clarifies the law**. *Charlip v. Lear Siegler, Inc.*[29] awarded simple interest to shareholders for the period from the date of the merger until the date of payment by the surviving corporation and concluded that compound interest could not be awarded incident to an appraisal proceeding in the absence of specific statutory authority.[30]	1 year and 9 months	
9.	1990	§212 (S.B. 467, 135th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 1990)	**Proxy voting procedures**. Amended subsection 212(c) provides non-exclusive methods for a stockholder to authorize a proxy, expressly permitting the use of datagram proxies via telegram, cablegram, or other electronic transmission to the proxy holder. However, the datagram proxy was required to include information confirming the stockholder's authorization to be deemed valid. Overall, the amendment modernized proxy voting procedures in light of evolving technology.[31]	**Clarifies the law**. The amendment clarifies uncertainties related to the validity of "proxygrams" raised by *Parshalle v. Roy*,[32] (holding "datagram" proxies used in a director election invalid given lack of "fundamental indicia of authenticity and genuineness that would provide a presumption of validity" without written signature or other identifying marks linking the proxy to the voter); and *Concord Financial Group, Inc. v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co. of Delaware*,[33] (holding that shares voted by proxies via telegrams that did not contain shareholder's signature or paper	8-9 months (2 holdings)	

[28] *Supra* note 20 at 18.
[29] *Charlip v. Lear Siegler, Inc.*, C.A. No. 5178 (Del. Ch. July 2, 1985).
[30] *Supra* note 22 at 316.
[31] S.B. 467, 135th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 1990) at 2, 9, https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/6840-135-89-90-sb-401---endpdf.
[32] *Parshalle v. Roy*, 567 A.2d 19 (Del. Ch. 1989)
[33] *Concord Financial Group, Inc. v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co. of Delaware*, 567 A.2d 1 (Del. Ch. 1989).

				trail as invalid while reserving the question whether proxygrams were permissible under Delaware law).[34]		
10	1990	§231 (S.B. 467, 135th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 1990)	**Stockholder voting procedures**. The amendment sets forth certain provisions on voting procedures at stockholder meetings. New Section 231(d) specifies information inspectors could consider when determining the validity of proxies and ballots. Such information included proxies and ballots, accompanying envelopes, details validating electronic proxies under new Section 212(c)(2), and regular corporate books and records.[35]	**Reverses case law**. The amendment reversed the decision made in *Concord Financial Group v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co.,*[36] which generally invalidated a practice used by election inspectors to contact brokerage houses or other institutions to determine how they intended to distribute votes; specifically invalidated all votes of a broker who had not voted its entire position for one side or the other. The amendment resolved the concern about the potential disenfranchisement of large numbers of stockholders by permitting inspectors to consider "other reliable information" to reconcile proxies and ballots.[37]	9 months	Shareholders
11	1994	§218(a) (S.B 326, 137th Gen Assemb. Reg. Sess. (June 1994))	**Voting trusts**. The amendment clarifies that a voting trust can be established either by a single stockholder acting alone or by two or more stockholders acting together.[38]	**Clarifies the law.** *Fixman v. Diversified Industries, Inc.*[39] ruled that a statutory voting trust required multiple stockholders, despite acknowledging the language	19 years	

[34] Lewis S. Black, Jr. & A. Gilchrist Sparks, III, *Analysis of the 1990 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law*, 311, 313-14 (Nov 1990), 6772-analysis-1990-amend-del-gen-corp-lawpdf (upenn.edu).
[35] *Supra* note 31 at 3, 10.
[36] *Supra* note 33.
[37] *Supra* note 34 at 315-316.
[38] Lewis S. Black, Jr. & Frederick H. Alexander, *Analysis of the 1994 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law*, 311, 314 (Nov 1994), 6773-analysis-1994-amend-del-gen-corp-lawpdf (upenn.edu).
[39] *Fixman v. Diversified Industries, Inc.*, C.A. No. 4721 (Del. Ch., May 5, 1975).

				seemed to allow single-stockholder.[40]		
12	1994	§§280-281 (S.B 357, 137th Gen Assemb. Reg. Sess. (June 1994))	**Corporate dissolution procedures**. The amendment refines the notice and claims procedure for dissolved corporations. Changes aimed to streamline the process, ensure timely presentation of claims, and limit potential liability by imposing a five-year limit on potential claims (extendable up to ten years at the discretion of the Court of Chancery), clarify payment procedures for current creditors, and require the inclusion of distribution amounts in dissolution notices.[41]	**Aligns statute with case law**. The amendment codifies present case law, incorporating suggestions from *In re RegO Company*, 623 A.2d 92 (Del. Ch. 1992), as well as from practitioners.[42]	1 year, 7 months	
13	1995	§203 (S.B 175, 138th Gen Assemb. Reg. Sess. (June 1995))	**Business combinations with interested stockholders.** Before the amendment, Section 203(a) restricted business combinations with interested stockholders. However, these restrictions did not apply if the board approved the transaction or stockholders before the "date" they became interested. Amended 203(a) clarifies that the term	**Aligns statute with case law**. The amendment codifies the holding in *Siegman v. Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc.*[44] The court had to interpret whether "date" meant a full calendar day or could mean a specific point in time. The court ruled that "date" should be interpreted as "time" in this context. This interpretation was important because it is common for boards to want to approve both a share acquisition (which makes a	6 years	

[40] *Supra* note 38.
[41] *Id* at 314-315.
[42] *Id* at 315.
[44] *Siegman v. Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc.*, 576 A.2d 625 (Del. Ch. 1989).

			"date" means "time", rather than a full calendar day.[43]	stockholder "interested") and a business combination with that stockholder in the same meeting. If "date" meant a full day, these actions would have to be separated by at least one day, which was seen as an unnecessary burden.[45]		
14	1995	§220 (S.B 175, 138th Gen Assemb. Reg. Sess. (June 1995))	**Inspection of books and records**. The 1995 amendment to Section 220 extended record inspection rights to members of non-stock corporations, equalizing them with those already held by shareholders in traditional stock-issuing companies.[46]	**Clarifies the law**. In *Scattered Corp. v. Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc.,*[47] the court refused to extend the statutory right of inspection to membership corporations.	At least 1 year	Members of non-stock corporations
15	1997	§211(b)-(c) (S.B. 106, 139th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §12-13 (Del. 1997))	**Stockholder Action Written Consent**. Delaware law requires corporations to hold annual meetings to elect directors. It was not clear if written consent from shareholders could replace the annual meeting. The amendment changed the law to clarify when written consent can replace an annual meeting: unanimous written consent can always replace the annual meeting; non-	**Clarifies the law**. The amendments respond to the *Hoschett* decision. In *TSI v. Hoschett* (1996), the Court of Chancery held that less-than-unanimous written consent could not replace a formal annual meeting in which stockholders can participate.[48]	9 months	

[43] Lewis S. Black, Jr. & Frederick H. Alexander, *Analysis of the 1995 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law*, 311, 313 (Oct 1995), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/6774-analysis-1995-amend-del-gen-corp-lawpdf.
[45] *Supra* note 43 at 313; *see also* 2 Delaware Corporation Law and Practice § 23.02 (2023) n. 16, 2 Delaware Corporation Law and Practice § 23.02 (lexis.com).
[46] *Supra* note 43 at 314.
[47] *Scattered Corp. v. Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc.,* Del.Ch., C.A. No. 13703 (Dec. 2, 1994).
[48] Lewis S. Black, Jr. & Frederick H. Alexander, *Analysis of the 1997 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law*, 311, 313-14 (Aug 1997).

			unanimous consent can replace the meeting, but only if: a) All director positions that could be filled at an annual meeting are vacant. b) All these vacant positions are filled by the written consent action.			
16	1998	§251(b)-(c) (S.B. 311, 139th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 1998))	**Mergers & director fiduciary duties**. Section 251 adresses directors' ability to revise their position on a merger agreement after board approval but before the stockholder vote. The amendmen requires directors to declare a merger "advisable" when they first approve it; but it allows merger agreements to include a clause requiring the merger to be presented to shareholders even if directors later *change their minds* and no longer recommend it.[49]	**Reverses case law**. The amendment to reverse the *Smith v. Van Gorkom*, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) decision, which held that a board of directors could not submit a merger to a stockholder vote if it had withdrawn its recommendation.[50]	13 years	
17	1999	§202 (S.B. 137, 140th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 1999))	**Restrictions on transfer and ownership of securities**. The amendment to Section 202(c)(4) expressly authorizes restrictions that obligate holders of securities to sell or transfer securities to the corporation or a third party.	**Clarifies the law**. Previous case law, e.g., *Greene v. EH. Rollins & Sons, Inc.,*[52] find forced transfer provisions under the rubric of transfer restrictions; but the amendment *explicitly* permits and expands certain types of transfer restrictions. In addition, transfer	61 & 22 years	

[49] S.B. 311, 139th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §44 (Del. 1998).

[50] *See* Lewis S. Black, Jr. & Frederick H. Alexander, *Analysis of the 1998 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law*, 4 (1998); Frederick H. Alexander & James D. Honaker*, Power to the Franchise or the Fiduciaries: An Analysis of the Limits on Stockholder Activist Bylaws*, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 749, 768 fn.64 (2008).

[52] *Greene v. EH. Rollins & Sons, Inc.,* 2 A.2d 249 (Del. Ch., 1938).

			In addition, the amendment to Section 202(d) expanded the types of transfer restrictions automatically considered reasonable, including those for preserving NOLs, qualifying as a REIT, maintaining any statutory or regulatory advantage, or complying with legal requirements.[51]	restrictions on stocks needed to be for a "reasonable purpose" under common law. Only restrictions for maintaining tax advantages, especially for subchapter S corporations, were automatically considered reasonable. In *Grynberg v. Burke* (1977),[53] the court held that the adoption of Section 202 in 1967 did not eliminate the reasonableness test for transfer restrictions. The amendment expanded the types of restrictions automatically considered reasonable.[54]		
18	2000	§122 (17) (S.B. 363, 140th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2000))	**Corporate opportunity**. The amendment provides companies with the power to renounce in advance, in their certificate of incorporation or by action of their board of directors, their interest or expectancy in specified business opportunities.[55]	**Clarifies the law**. The amendment clarifies the uncertainty regarding the power of a corporation to renounce corporate opportunities in advance raised in *Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc.*[56] In that case, the court ruled that a charter amendment, which sought to specify when certain shareholders and their appointed directors could engage in the same line of business as the corporation or pursue corporate opportunities belonging to it, could be	11 years	Directors

[51] S.B. 137, 140th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §4 (Del. 1999), legis.delaware.gov/json/BillDetail/GetHtmlDocument?fileAttachmentId=15031.
[53] *Grynberg v. Burke*,[53] 378 A.2d 139 (Del. Ch., 1977).
[54] Lewis S. Black, Jr. & Frederick H. Alexander, *Analysis of the 1999 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law*, 3 (Aug 1999), 6778-analysis-1999-amend-del-gen-corp-law1pdf (upenn.edu).
[55] Lewis S. Black, Jr. & Frederick H. Alexander, *Analysis of the 2000 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law*, 2-3 (Aug 2000).
[56] *Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures*, Inc., C. A. No. 9477 (Del. Ch. May 5, 1989, revised May 30, 1989).

				interpreted as eliminating or limiting directors' duty of loyalty.		
19	2002	§203(a)(2), §203(c)(8) (S.B. 361, 141st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2002))	**Business combinations involving interested stockholders** Section 203 deals with business combinations involving large shareholders. The amendment clarified that "voting stock" refers to voting power, not just number of shares. It also specified how to calculate the 85% exemption,[57] and exclude director-officer and certain employee stock plan shares when determining total voting stock but include them when calculating the interested stockholder's ownership.[58]	**Clarifies the law**. The amendment addressed issues raised in re Digex Inc. Shareholders Litigation, De l. Ch. 789 A.2d 1176 (2000). The court questioned whether "voting stock" in Section 203(a)(2) meant voting power or simply shares with voting rights. The amendment clarified this ambiguity.	One year and six months	
20	2003	§103(c)(3), §103(c)(4) (H.B. 306, 142nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2003))	**Filing mechanics for corporate documents with the Delaware Secretary of State.** Before the 2003 amendment, Section 103(c) stated that when a document was filed and fees paid, the Division of Corporations was to certify that the instrument had been filed, and the date and hour of its filing. The Secretary of State's endorsement of the filing date was conclusive of the date and time of filing in the absence	**Aligns statute with case law**. In Liebermann v. Frangiosa (Dec. 4, 2002), the court commented that with technological advances, the Secretary of State's office is better positioned to accurately record the actual time of filing. The court noted that the current policies had generated "litigable arguments" and suggested that the office would likely revise its practices after experiencing this issue.	7 months	

[57] Section 203 imposes a three-year moratorium on business combinations between corporations and "interested stockholders" (generally those owning 15% or more of voting stock). An exception applies if the interested stockholder owns at least 85% of voting stock after the transaction making them an interested stockholder.

[58] Lewis S. Black, Jr. & Frederick H. Alexander, *Analysis of the 2002 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law*, 3-4 (Aug 2002).

			of actual fraud. Over time, a practice developed where certain registered agents and the Division of Corporations gave documents a filing time different from the actual delivery time to the Division. The 2003 amendment clarified that the Secretary of State will record the actual delivery time as the filing time, with exceptions.[59]			
21	2003	§146 (S.B. 127, 142nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2003))	**Agreements to submit matters to a vote of stockholders**. The amendment provides that a board of directors can commit a corporation to submit *a matter* for stockholder approval even if the board of directors subsequently determines to recommend against the matter. It extends the rule adopted in 1998 amendment to Section 251 (c) which originally applied only to *mergers*, to encompass all matters requiring stockholder approval.[60]	**Aligns statute with case law**. Section 146 is part of a legislative evolution that began as a response to *Smith v. Van Gorkom*.[61] According to this decision, a board of directors could not submit a merger to a stockholder vote if it had withdrawn its recommendation. Section 146 represents another step in overturning this rule, applying the reversal not just to mergers but to all matters requiring stockholder approval.[62]	18 years	
22	2003	§3114 (title 10) (S.B 126, 142nd Gen.	**Personal Jurisdiction Over Corporate Officers** Section 3114 deals with personal jurisdiction over non-resident	**Aligns statute with case law**. The amendment expands the concept of deemed consent to certain senior officers as first	26 years	Shareholders

[59] Lewis S. Black, Jr. & Frederick H. Alexander, *Analysis of the 2003 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law*, 3-4 (Aug 2003).
[60] *Id.*
[61] *Smith v. Van Gorkom*, Del. Supr., 488 A.2d 858 (1985).
[62] Frederick H. Alexander & James D. Honaker*, Power to the Franchise or the Fiduciaries: An Analysis of the Limits on Stockholder Activist Bylaws*, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 749, 768 fn.64 (2008).

		Assemb., Reg. Sess (Del. 2003).	directors of Delaware corporations. Before the 2003 amendment, by accepting a director position, an individual is deemed to have consented to service of process in actions claiming violation of their duty as a director. This only applied to directors, not officers. The amendments extend the concept of deemed consent to certain senior officers. This amendment came in response to failures in corporate governance that received widespread publicity.[63]	suggested by the Federal Courts (*Schaffer v. Heitner*, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)).		
23	2005	§271(H.B 150, 143rd Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess (Del. 2005))	Section 271 has been amended to add new subsection (c). The purpose of subsection (c) is to provide that no stockholder vote is required for a sale, lease or exchange of assets to or with a direct or indirect wholly-owned and controlled subsidiary; and that the assets of such a subsidiary are to be treated as assets of its ultimate parent for purposes of applying, at the parent level, the requirements set forth in subsection (a).[64]	**Clarifies the law**. In Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger International, Inc., 858 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 2004) the Court of Chancery raised questions about whether Section 271, when read literally, would allow holding companies to dispose of assets held in subsidiaries without a stockholder vote at the holding company level. However, the court ultimately did not make a definitive ruling on this issue in the Hollinger case. The amendment appears to be a response to this uncertainty.[65]	9 months	
24	2006	§141(b) (S.B 322, 143rd	**Majority Voting**.	**Clarifies the law**. Prior to the amendment, it was questionable	9 months	Shareholders

[63] *Supra* note 59.
[64] Synopsis of H.B 150, 143rd Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess (Del. 2005).
[65] Frederick H. Alexander, Esq. & Jeffrey R. Wolters, Esq., *Analysis of the 2002 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law*, 5 (Aug. 2005).

		Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess (Del. 2006))	The General Assembly amended Section 141(b) of the DGCL to clarify that a director may tender an irrevocable resignation that is effective upon a later date or upon the happening of a future event, such as a failure to receive a specified vote for reelection. The amendment provides directors a means for implementing majority voting policies and bylaws that seek to unseat a director who fails to receive a majority vote in an election.	whether a director, as a fiduciary, could irrevocably agree to resign if some future conditions were met. The amendment appears to be a response to this uncertainty. *See Dillon v. Berg*, 326 F. Supp. 1214, 1225, (D. Del.), aff'd, 453 F.2d 1876 (3d Cir. 1971).		
25	2007	§262 (H.B 160, 144th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2007))	**Appraisal** The amendment adds to Section 262 a default interest rate for appraisal awards. Amended Section 262(h) specifies that, unless the Court of Chancery sets a different interest rate in its discretion "for good cause shown," interest on an appraisal award will accrue and compound quarterly from the effective date of the merger through the date the judgment is paid at "5% over the Federal Reserve discount rate (including any surcharge) as established from time to time during the period between the effective date of the merger and	**Clarifies the law**. Before the amendment, the courts had considerable leeway in determining interest rates in appraisal cases, but lacked clear guidance. Indeed, Vice Chancellor Strine noted that "the crafting of a specific legislative interest formula... for use in appraisal proceedings is both feasible and desirable for all affected constituencies."[67]	1 year and 10 months	Shareholders

[67] Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., 2005 WL 2045640, at *21 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2005); Charles K. Korsmo & Minor Myers, *Interest in Appraisal*, 42 J.CORP. L. 109, 119 (2016).

			the date of payment of the judgment."[66]			
26	2008	§225 (S.B 244, 144th Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess (Del. 2008))	**Corporate standing to challenge non-election stockholder votes**. The amendment to Section 225(b) enables a corporation to apply to the Delaware Court of Chancery to determine the result of any vote on any matter submitted for a vote of stockholders or members of a non-stock membership corporation, unless the matter is the election of directors, officers or members of the governing body of a nonstock membership corporation.[68]	**Clarifies the law**. In cases like Insituform of North America, Inc. v. Chandler, 534 A.2d 257 (Del. Ch. 1987) and Agranoff v. Miller, 734 A.2d 1066 (Del. Ch. 1999), the Court of Chancery questioned whether corporations had standing under Section 225(a) to bring actions resolving contests over directorships and other corporate offices.[69]	21 years	
27	2009	§145(f) (H.B 19, 145th Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess (Del. 2009))	**Retroactive revocation of indemnification**. The amendment specify a default rule for when indemnification and expenses advancement rights vest. The new default rule provides directors with some assurance that if the certificate of incorporation or bylaws provides for indemnification or advancement at the time they were acting in their corporate capacity, those rights cannot be	**Reverses case law**. Schoon v. Troy Corp., 948 A.2d 1157, 1165-1166 (Del. Ch. 2008) held that the right to indemnification under a bylaw does not vest, and therefore can be revoked from a director indemnitee prior to a lawsuit being filed against the director.[71]	1 year	Director and officers

[66] Jeffrey R. Wolters, Esq. & James D. Honaker, Esq., *Analysis of the 2007 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law*, 5 (Aug. 2007); Synopsis of H.B 160, 144th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2007).

[68] Jeffrey R. Wolters, Esq. & James D. Honaker, Esq., *Analysis of the 2008 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law*, 3-4 (Aug. 2008).

[69] *Id.*

[71] Synopsis of H.B 19, 145th Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess (Del. 2009).

			revoked by future amendments to that provision.[70]			
28	2009	§113 (H.B 19, 145th Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess (Del. 2009))	**Proxy expense reimbursement**. The amendment explicitly authorizes bylaws requiring corporations to reimburse stockholders' proxy solicitation expenses for nominating directors. It also provided a non-exclusive list of conditions that could be imposed on this reimbursement right.[72]	**Reverses case law**. The Delaware Supreme Court held in *CA, Inc. v. AFSCME* that stockholder-adopted bylaws governing procedures and processes related to director elections were generally valid under the DGCL.[73] The court also held, however, that a bylaw provision requiring the corporation to reimburse expenses incurred by a stockholder soliciting proxies in support of dissident director nominees would be invalid if it did not include a provision allowing the board to deny reimbursement if the board determined that its *fiduciary duties* required it to do so.[74] The amendment partially overturns the CA, Inc. v. AFSCME decision. While it codifies the court's validation of reimbursement bylaws, it notably omits the	8 months	Shareholders

[70] Jeffrey R. Wolters, Esq. & James D. Honaker, Esq., *Analysis of the 2009 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law*, 5 (Aug. 2009).
[72] *Id.*
[73] *CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan*, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008).
[74] *Supra* note 70, at page 3.

				"fiduciary out" requirement mandated by the court.		
29	2013	§204 (H.B 127, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess (Del.2013))	**Ratification of defective corporate** New §204 provides a safe harbor procedure for ratifying corporate acts that, due to a "failure of authorization", would be void or voidable.[75]	**Reverses case law**. The amendment reverses holdings such as STAAR Surgical Co. v. Waggoner, 588 A.2d 1130 (Del. 1991) and Blades v. Wisehart, 2010 WL 4638603 (Del. Ch. Nov. 17, 2010), according to which corporate acts or transactions and stock found to be "void" due to a failure to comply with the applicable provisions of the DGCL or the corporation's organizational documents may not be ratified or otherwise validated on equitable grounds.[76]	3 years	
30	2013	§251(f) (H.B 127, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess (Del.2013))	**Merger agreement**. In Delaware's traditional legal framework governing a two-step merger transaction, the initial phase involves the acquirer tendering for shares of the target company, followed by a second step that results in the acquirer owning all of the target's shares. According to the then-existing law, if the acquirer did not secure	**Clarifies the law & Aligns statute with case law.** Before the amendment, top-up options emerged to navigate around the vote requirement. These options enable a buyer that has already acquired a majority stake to purchase additional shares to reach the 90 percent threshold, thereby qualifying for a short-form merger.[79] Although Delaware courts appeared	2 years	

[75] Synopsis of H.B 127, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess (Del.2013); Norman M. Powell & John J. Paschetto*, Delaware Transactional & Corporate Law Update*, page 3-4 (2013); Jeffrey R. Wolters, Esq. & James D. Honaker, Esq., *Analysis of the 2013 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law*, 2-3 (Sep. 2013).
[76] *Id.*
[79] Ariel Yehezkel, *Delaware General Corporation Law Amended to Speed Up the Consummation of Two-Step Merger Transactions*, SHEPPARD, MULLIN – CORP. & SEC. LAW BLOG (Aug. 27, 2013), https://www.corporatesecuritieslawblog.com/2013/08/delaware-general-corporation-law-amended-to-speed-up-the-consummation-of-two-step-merger-transactions/.
("To use a top-up option, the target must have a sufficient number of authorized but unissued shares and treasury shares to allow it to issue the number of shares required to be issued upon the exercise of the top-up option.").

			at least 90% of the target's shares, the second-step merger required a "long form" process, necessitating a shareholder meeting and approval vote, in contrast to the more streamlined "short-form" merger.[77] The amendment allows a waiver for the stockholder vote if an acquirer secured a majority in a tender offer, under certain conditions.[78]	to acknowledge the lack of practical utility of requiring a costly stockholder vote when the acquirer already had the power to determine the vote's outcome, they concluded that they did not have the mandate to eliminate this requirement. Instead, they could only legitimize the practice of top-up options.[80] The amendment *directly* resolves the limitations of the previous legal framework.		
31	2014	§141(f) (H.B 329, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess (Del.2014))	**Board consent.** Section 141(f) was amended to clarify that a person may execute a consent, and that such consent may be placed in escrow (or similar arrangement), to become effective at a later time, even if the person is not a director at the time the consent is executed, so long as the escrow period does not exceed 60 days.[81]	**Reverses case law**. The holdings the U.S. Federal District Court suggested in U.S. Bank National Association v. Verizon Communications Inc., that a non-director could not sign a director consent with instructions that the consent be released from escrow at the time the person became a director. This case suggested that a person had to be a director at the literal moment that the "wet	2 years	

[77] *Id.* If the acquirer was able to purchase at least 90 percent of the target, it could consummate the second-step merger immediately following the closing of the tender offer, through a short form merger under Section 253 of the DGCL, without incurring the costs associated with a shareholder vote.

[78] *Id.*

[80] Top-up options have been commonly used in two-step transactions and were generally approved as a viable option by Delaware courts. *See, e.g., In re* Cogent, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 7 A.3d 487 (Del. Ch. 2010); *Olson v. ev3, Inc.*, No. 5583-VCL, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 34, at *2-5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 21, 2011). Norman M. Powell & John J. Paschetto, *Recent Amendments to Delaware's Corporation Law: Two-Step Corporate Takeovers Are Simplified and Public Benefit Corporations Are Permitted Among Other Changes*, YOUNG CONAWAY STARGATT & TAYLOR, LLP—DELAWARE TRANSACTIONAL & CORPORATE LAW UPDATE (2013), https://www.youngconaway.com/content/uploads/2017/08/DETransUpdateSummer2013.pdf.

[81] *Id.*

				signature" is placed on the consent.[82]		
32	2015	§102(f); §109(b); §114(b) (S.B 75, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess (Del. 2015))	**Fee-Shifting in Stockholder Litigation**. New Section 102(f) and section 109(b) *prohibit* stock corporations from adopting "loser-pays" fee-shifting charter or bylaw provisions for certain types of stockholder litigation and other intra-corporate disputes. Under these new provisions, neither the charter nor the bylaws can include a provision that would impose liability on a stockholder for attorneys' fees or expenses of the corporation (or any other party) in connection with specifically defined "internal corporate claims." Under new Section 115, an "internal corporate claim" is any claim (including a derivative claim brought in the right of the corporation): (i) that is based on a violation of a duty by any person in his or her capacity as a current or former director, officer or stockholder, or (ii) for which the DGCL vests the Delaware Court of Chancery with the jurisdiction	**Clarifies the law**. The *ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund et al.*, ruling upheld, as facially valid, a Delaware nonstock membership corporation fee-shifting bylaw.[84] The amendment does not directly overturn *ATP*, but instrad limits the potential expansion of the ruling to stock corporations.[85]	1 year, 1 month	Shareholders

[82] Jeffrey R. Wolters, Esq. & James D. Honaker, Esq., *Analysis of the 2014 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law*, 3 (Sep. 2014); Norman M. Powell & John J. Paschetto*, Delaware Transactional & Corporate Law Update*, pages 5-6 (Sep. 2014).

[84] *ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund*, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014).

[85] Norman M. Powell & John J. Paschetto*, Delaware Transactional & Corporate Law Update*, 4 (Sep. 2015)

			to decide. A related amendment to Section 114(b) provides that these bans on fee-shifting provisions *do not apply* to non-stock membership corporations.[83]			
33	2015	§115 (S.B 75, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess (Del. 2015))	**Forum Selection Bylaws**. New Section 115 confirms that the certificate of incorporation and bylaws of the corporation may effectively specify, consistent with applicable jurisdictional requirements, that claims arising under the DGCL, including claims of breach of fiduciary duty, must be brought only in the courts in this State (including the federal court).[86]	**Aligns statute with case law & Reverses case law**. The amendment essentially confirms the Chancery Court ruling in *Boilermakers,*[87] which upheld the validity of bylaws requiring that claims arising under the DGCL be brought only in Delaware courts. The amendment essentially overturns the Supreme Court decision in *First Citizens*,[88] which upheld the validity of bylaws requiring that claims be brought outside Delaware.[89]	1 year, 11 months	Directors & officers
34	2016	§262 (H.B. 371, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2016))	**Appraisal**. The amendment to Section 262(h) provides an option for the surviving corporation to pay to the stockholders seeking appraisal a sum of money, the amount of which is to be determined in the sole discretion of the surviving corporation, at any time before	**Clarifies the law**. Vice Chancellor Glasscock expressed concerns about the statutory interest rate in appraisal cases potentially incentivizing unnecessary litigation or delaying tactics (Huff Fund v. CKx;[91] In re	3 years	Directors / Controlling shareholders

[83] Jeffrey R. Wolters, Esq. & James D. Honaker, Esq., *Analysis of the 2015 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law*, 2 (Aug. 2015).
[86] Synopsis of S.B 75, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess (Del. 2015).
[87] In *Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corporation*, 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013).
[88] *See City of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc.,* 99 A.3d 229, 239 (Del. Ch. 2014) ("The DGCL does not express any preference of the General Assembly one way or the other on whether it is permissible for boards of directors to require stockholders to litigate intra-corporate disputes in the courts of foreign jurisdictions.").
[89] *Supra* note 83, at page 3.
[91] Huff Fund Inv. P'ship v. CKx Inc., Civ. A. No. 6844-VCG, 2013 WL 6910997 (Del. Ch. 2013).

			judgment is entered in the appraisal proceeding, with the result of avoiding the need to pay subsequently accruing interest on that sum.[90]	ISN Software Corp.[92]). The amendment addresses these concerns by allowing corporations to make prepayments to reduce interest accrual on potential appraisal awards.		
35	2018	§204(h)(1) (S.B 180, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2018))	**A corporate act that involves a failure of authorization**. The amendment clarifies that any acts within a corporation's general powers may be ratified under Section 204 for any failure of authorization. This amendment is intended to confirm that corporate acts that were not authorized in accordance with the requirements of the DGCL are still "within the power of a corporation" for purposes of Section 204(h)(1) (other than acts that involve the exercise of a power expressly prohibited, such as the exercise of banking powers).[93]	**Reverses case law**. The amendment reverses the suggestion in Nguyen v. View, Inc., C.A. No. 11138-VCS (Del. Ch. June 6, 2017) that acts deliberately rejected by stockholders might not be considered "defective corporate acts" eligible for ratification under Section 204.	1 year	Directors & officers
36	2020	§145(c)(2) (H.B. 341, 150th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2020))	**Out-of-pocket liability protections (indemnification).** New subsection (2) permits (but does not require) a corporation to indemnify other persons who are not current or former directors or	**Aligns statute with case law**. The amendment is consistent with existing case law (Cochran v. Stifel Financial Corp.)[95]. The ruling allowed corporations to indemnify non-directors/officers based solely	20 years	Officers

[90] Synopsis of H.B. 371, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2016).
[92] . Appraisal Litig., C.A. No. 8388-VCG (Del. Ch. Sept. 26, 2013).
[93] Louis G. Hering And Melissa A. Divincenzo, *2018 Amendments to Delaware's General Corporation Law and Alternative Entity Statutes*, 1-2 (2018); Norman M. Powell, John J. Paschetto, and Justin P. Duda, *Delaware Transactional & Corporate Law Update,* 11 (Sep. 2018).
[95] Cochran v. Stifel Financial Corp., Del. Ch. C.A. No. 17350 (2000).

			officers if they are successful in defense of a proceeding referenced in subsections (a) and (b) of Section 145.[94]	on successful defense, without assessing behavioral requirements in §145(a) or (b). The amendment affirms and codifies this principle.		
37	2022	§145 (S.B 203, 151st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2022))	**Out-of-pocket liability protections (Captive Insurance)** The 2022 amendments to Section 145(g) expressly authorize a corporation to purchase and maintain insurance through the use of a "captive insurance company"; that is, an insurer that is directly or indirectly owned, controlled and funded by the corporation.[96]	**Addresses the consequences of the court decision without directly challenging it**. The captive insurance amendment responds to several Delaware court decisions, particularly the *Boeing* case,[97] which arguably expanded directors' potential liability for oversight failures. While not directly overturning these rulings, the amendment provides a legislative solution to concerns about increased director liability.[98]	4 months	Directors
38	2022	§102(b)(7) (S.B 273, 151st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2022))	**Out-of-pocket liability protections (officers exculpation)** The amendment allows corporations to exculpate officers from monetary liability for duty of care by including such a provision in their certificate of incorporation.[99] Officer exculpation applies only to *direct* (and not derivative) claims—the	**Addresses the consequences of the court decision without directly challenging it**. The 2022 amendment to Section 102(b)(7) responds to a series of court decisions that arguably increased officers' exposure to duty of care claims, particularly in merger litigation. Courts allowed several of these claims to proceed,	At least 1 year, 6 months	Officers

[94] Synopsis of H.B. 341, 150th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2020).
[96] Daniel D. Matthews, Esq. and Kyle A. Pinder, Esq., *Analysis of the 2022 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law*, 1 (Nov. 2022).
[97] *In re* Boeing Co. Derivative Litig., No. 2019-0907-MTZ, 2021 WL 4059934 (Del. Ch. 2021).
[98] John J. Paschetto and Kenneth L. Norton, Norman M. Powell, John J. Paschetto, and Justin P. Duda, *Delaware Transactional & Corporate Law Update, 1 (Apr. 2022).*
[99] Synopsis of S.B 273, 151st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2022); Ethan Klingsberg & Oliver Board, *DGCL Amendment Merits Amending Charters and Engagement with Institutional Shareholders*, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sep. 20, 2022) https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/09/04/dgcl-amendment-merits-amending-charters-and-engagement-with-institutional-shareholders/.

			type of claims that are typical in M&A litigation.[100]	exposing officers to potential personal liability.[101]		
39	2024	§122(18) (S.B 313, 152nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2024))	**Shareholders agreements** The amendment explicitly allows corporations to enter into agreements with current or prospective stockholders that delegate certain governance rights, including consent rights on corporate actions, regardless of whether these rights are provided in the corporation's charter.[102]	**Reverses case law.** The amendment directly responds to and effectively overturns the *Moelis* decision which invalidated several provisions in an agreement between a corporation and its founding shareholder.[103] The agreement required the board to obtain the founder's consent before taking various actions, limited the board's discretion over the board's size and composition, and required the board to ensure significant founder representation on all committees.[104] The court held that the *combination* of these provisions was facially invalid because it infringed on the board authority under Section 141(a),	4 months	Controlling shareholders

[100] Another related amendment allowed the company to explicitly define which senior officers would be subject to the definition of "officer" in those sections of the DGCL that grant indemnification and reimbursement of expenses to officers. That clause allows companies to cover a wider group of officers. This additional amendment was also motivated by the increased litigation risk that officers faced, which according to market participants necessitated clarifying the uncertainty surrounding the definition of "officer" and the legal protections provided to officers. H.B. 341, 150th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2020).

[101] *Supra* note 96, at 1-2, note 4; *Morrison v. Berry*, No. 12802-VCG, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1412 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2019); *In re* Mindbody, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 2019-0442-KSJM, 2020 WL 5870084 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2020); *In re* Baker Hughes Inc., Merger Litig., No. 2019-0638-AGB, 2020 WL 6281427 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 2020); *City of Warren Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys., v. Roche*, No. 2019-0740-PAF, 2020 WL 7023896 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2020); *In re* Coty S'holder Litig., No. 2019-0336-AGB, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 269 (Del. Ch. Aug. 17, 2020); Voigt v. Metcalf, No. 2018-0828-JTL, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 55 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2020).

[102] Synopsis of S.B 313, 152nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2024), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/13136-sb313pdf.

[103] *In West Palm Beach Firefighters' Pension Fund v. Moelis & Co.*, No. 2023-0309-JTL (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2024).

[104] Jordan Howell, *Sparks fly in final hearing on corporate law amendments*, DEL. CALL (June 22, 2024), https://delawarecall.com/2024/06/22/sparks-fly-in-final-hearing-on-corporate-law-amendments/ ("The agreement contained provisions that delineated 'eighteen different categories of action' that must be pre-approved by Moelis in writing and, according to Laster, these requirements "encompass virtually everything the Board can do.' Moelis was entitled to nominate a majority of the Board seats, and the current Board 'must recommend that stockholders vote in favor of Moelis' designees,' 'must use reasonable efforts to enable Moelis' designees to be elected and continue to serve,' and 'must fill any vacancy in a seat occupied by a Moelis designee with a new Moelis designee.'").

				which establishes that the management and affairs of a Delaware corporation must be directed by or under the oversight of its board. According to the *Moelis* court, boards cannot transfer their authority to a third party unless explicitly permitted in the company's *certificate of incorporation*.		
40	2024	§147, §232, §268 (S.B 313, 152nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2024))	**Merger approval process**. The amendment aims to provide greater flexibility and clarity in the merger approval process, and among other things, it allows the board to approve agreements in a "substantially final" form (i.e., less than final form), provided that all "material terms" are set forth or ascertainable at the time of approval.[105]	**Reverses case law.** The amendment was initiated in response to *Activision* opinion. In this case, the Court of Chancery addressed several issues regarding merger agreement approval processes. The court held that a board must approve an "essentially complete" version of the agreement, and that delegation to a committee to finalize certain terms after board approval may be problematic. The court also found that inadequate notice to stockholders could render a merger not duly authorized.[106]	4 months	
41	2024	§261(a)(1) (S.B 313, 152nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2024))	**Pre-closing merger breach damages**. The amendment addressed the question of whether a target can sue for damages on behalf of shareholders for lost premium resulting from the buyer's pre-	**Reverses and Clarifies case law**. In *Consolidated Edison, Inc. v. Northeast Utilities* (2005) the Second Circuit ruled against target companies seeking compensation for lost shareholder premium.[108] For nearly two decades, Delaware's	8 months	

[105] Synopsis of S.B 313, 152nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2024), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/13136-sb313pdf.
[106] *Sjunde AP-Fonden v. Activision Blizzard, Inc.*, C.A. No. 2022-1001-KSJM (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2024).
[108] *Consolidated Edison, Inc. v. Northeast Utilities*, 426 F.3d 524 (2d Cir. 2005).

			closing breaches. It clarifies that merger agreements may specify remedies for pre-closing breaches, including damages for lost shareholder premium, and enables the delegation of the authority to enforce this right to a shareholders' representative.[107]	courts position on the matter was not clear and practitioners often used contractual terms to enable the affected company to claim such compensation on behalf of shareholders who are not parties to the merger agreement.[109] In *Crispo v. musk*,[110] the Court of Chancery suggested, *in dicta*, that Delaware might follow the Second Circuit approach and questioned the legality of the prevailing contractual terms.[111] The amendment responds to the *Crispo* ruling.		

[107] Synopsis of S.B 313, 152nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2024), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/13136-sb313pdf.
[109] *See* Morris Nichols, *Proposed Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law Would Address Recent Caselaw Regarding Stockholder Agreements and Merger Agreements* (Mar. 28, 2024), https://www.morrisnichols.com/insights-proposed-2024-amendments-delaware-general-corporation-law.
[110] *Crispo v. Musk*, 304 A.3d 567 (Del. Ch. 2023).
[111] *Id.*